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ABSTRACT 
 
Instability in Social Dilemma Games: Experimental Evidence 
 
Starting from the discovery of “prisoner’s dilemma” (originally framed by Merrill Flood and 
Melvin Dresher in 1950), in more than half a century, a lot of economic researches devoted to 
study the problem of social dilemma.  The social dilemma refers to a situation in which 
individuals in a group profit from self-interested action unless all group members make the 
self-interested choices, then which results in the loss of the whole group. In experimental 
economics, based on the basic game of the prisoner’s dilemma, the voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM) and the common-pool resources (CPR) successively have been proposed. 
Each of them attempts to capture the conflict between the individual interest and the group 
interest in different situations. Because of the concise of game theory framework, all of those 
previous studies employed an equilibrium analysis based on the core concept of Nash 
equilibrium in game theory. However, they overlooked the discussion for the stability of the 
Nash equilibrium in such games. Once the Nash equilibrium is unstable, the equilibrium 
analysis is invalid. 
           Recently, Saijo (2014, 2015) and Saijo et al. (2016) investigated the stability property in 
both the VCM and the CPR situations. Through a dynamic analysis, the Nash equilibrium is 
unstable or non-globally stable under some particular conditions. Furthermore, by examining 
previous experimental studies, he found that a lot of published literature using the equilibrium 
analysis actually employed an experimental design in which the Nash equilibrium is unstable. 
This result raises a doubt whether the results from previous experimental studies are valid.   
          In order to determine the implications of this new theoretical insight in the field of 
experimental studies, in this thesis, we employ the methodology of experimental economics. 
Specifically, we design new experiments or reanalyze the data from previous experimental 
studies to examine the distance between theoretical predictions of Saijo (2014, 2015) and Saijo 
et al. (2016) and experimental observations.   
         First, we conduct a new experiment with a homogeneous design to investigate the 
dynamic pattern of contributing behavior in the VCM with two different quasi-linear payoff 
functions. The design of this study is based on the theory of Saijo (2014). As the theory 
predicted, one treatment is stable, and the other one is unstable.  Although we have not found 
a clearly unstable pulsing in the group total contribution from the unstable treatment, we 
found a significant difference in the dynamic patterns of contributing behavior between the 
two treatments. The experimental results show that, the system is converging to the interior 
dominant equilibrium in the stable treatment. The average contribution decreases with 
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repeated trials and individual contributions converge and become steady. In contrast, in the 
unstable treatment, although contributions on average are also decreasing in repeated trials 
with no clearly unstable pulsing in the group’s total contribution, individual contributions 
diverge and continuously change.  Since these observations do not support the hypothesis that 
the system of the unstable treatment is asymptotically stable, it indicates that only a 
comparative static analysis might not be suitable for the VCM with this setting. 
         Second, based on the theory of Saijo (2015), we introduce the heterogeneity in benefits 
from the public good into the design of the unstable treatment in the first study and design 
four treatments with an identical Nash equilibrium, but with different stability properties. We 
clearly observe significant differences in the belief formation process, the responding process 
and the convergence of contributing behavior of subjects across the four treatments. The Nash 
equilibrium is a good predictor for the two globally stable treatments. However, for the two 
locally stable treatments, it is not. Furthermore, the non-convergence in the two locally stable 
treatments does not stem from the local stability, but from the changes in both the belief 
formation process and the responding process of subjects. 
        Third, I turn to the instability in the CPR. Based on the theory of Saijo et al. (2016), we 
reanalyze the data from the previous studies. We make a connection between the new insight 
of local instability and the unexplained pulsing behavior among players. Moreover, the 
reanalysis shows that the local instability is also a reason for the inefficiency in experiments 
summarized by Ostrom et al. (2006).   
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The content of this thesis reaches the experimental investigation for the instability argument in 
two social dilemma games: the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and the common-
pool resources (CPR) game. Chapter 2 investigates the experimental performance for the 
theoretical argument of instability in the VCM with a homogeneous design. In Chapter 3, we 
investigate the experimental performance for the theoretical argument of global or non-global 
stability in the VCM with a heterogeneous design. Finally, in Chapter 4, we investigate the 
experimental performance for the theoretical argument of instability in the CPR.1 Therefore, in 
the introduction part, I successively introduce the basic models of the VCM and the CPR. Then, 
I clarify the theoretical instability arguments and their implications. Finally, I explain the 
methodology of experiment economics that I employed to empirically examine the theoretical 
results. 
    
1.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
The VCM usually is mentioned as a mechanism for privately providing public goods. 
Therefore, it is also called the public goods game. When a group of people face a situation that 
a common project needs to be funded and then everyone in the group can benefit from this 
common project, a simple mechanism could be proposed for the problem, which is the VCM. 
Each of the group members could voluntarily decide how much he/she want to contribute to 
the group account from his/her own private account.  
          Bergstrom et al. (1986) provides a general theoretical discussion for the VCM. Here, I use 
a simple linear model to illustrate the basic idea of the VCM. In economics, from a simple case, 
economists always attempt to use a mathematic model to capture the relation between the 
group members’ personal decisions and their outcomes at the end. For example, consider a 
VCM environment that a group of villagers want to build a road for their village via voluntary 
contributions. In this game, for a set of players 𝛪 = {1, … , n}, each has a differentiable quasi-
linear payoff function 𝜋𝑖 from consuming a private good (money) 𝑥𝑖 and a single public good 
                                                          
1 Chapter 2 is a joint work with Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Xiangdong Qin and Junyi Shen. An earlier version 
was published as Feng et al. (2018). Chapter 3 is developed in collaboration with Yoshio Kamijo and 
Tatsuyoshi Saijo. Chapter 4 is a part of the content in a joint work with Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Yutaka 
Kobayashi. The full version can be found in Saijo et al. (2017).   
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(road) 𝑆 that is the sum of all individual contributions (hours of labor input) denoted by 𝑠𝑖  
from players.2 That is 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑆) = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖(𝑆), where 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and 𝑡𝑖(𝑆) is player i’s personal 
benefits from 𝑆. Generally, 𝑡𝑖(𝑆) might be nonlinear functions and different among players. 
However, most previous studies employ a linear and homogeneous design for them. Here, for 
simplicity, I also follow the usual design in this introduction but in the below studies, the 
assumption is changed with the purpose of discussions. Let 𝑡𝑖(𝑆) = 𝛼𝑆, where 𝛼 is a positive 
constant, and 𝐸𝑖 denote the endowment of player i such that 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖. Then, player i faces 
the following maximization problem. 
 
    𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑖  𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼(𝑠𝑖 + 𝑆−𝑖) 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖,                                                                      (1.1) 
 
where 𝑆−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Let 𝜋𝑖(𝐸𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑆−𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑆−𝑖). A combination of individual 
contributions ?̂? = (?̂?1, ?̂?2, ⋯ , ?̂?𝑛) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i, 𝑣𝑖(?̂?𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) ≥ 𝑣𝑖(𝑠𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) for all 
𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0,  𝐸𝑖], where ?̂?−𝑖 = ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Then, we have the following three different cases in which we 
can get  
(1). 𝛼 ≥ 1. In this case, since the benefit from contributing the hours of labor to building the 
road is always larger than keeping it privately, the best choice for player i is contributing all his 
endowments of hours to build the road. The Nash equilibrium, therefore, is ?̂? = (𝐸1, 𝐸2, ⋯ , 𝐸𝑛).   
(2). 𝛼 ≤ 1/𝑛. This case is totally contrasted to the above case. Now, since the benefit from 
contributing the hours of labor to building the road is always smaller than keeping it privately, 
the best choice for player i is contributing zero to build the road. The Nash equilibrium, 
therefore, is ?̂? = (0,0, ⋯ ,0).   Furthermore, since 𝛼 is so small, even smaller than 1/n, if all group 
members still decide to build the road and ask every group member to contribute, the benefit 
at the end is still dominated by the benefit from not constructing the road.   
(3). 1/𝑛 < 𝛼 < 1. The third case is in the midway of above two cases. First, since 𝛼 < 1, since 
the benefit from contributing the hours of labor to building the road is always smaller than 
keeping it privately, the best choice for player i is contributing zero to build the road. The Nash 
equilibrium, therefore, is also ?̂? = (0,0, ⋯ ,0). However, since 1/𝑛 < 𝛼, if all group members 
decide to build the road and ask every group member to contribute, the benefit at the end is 
larger than the benefit from not constructing the road. Thus, for individual group members, 
the best choice is contribute nothing but for the whole group, the best choice is contribute 
everything. 
         Since case (3) captures the conflict between the individual interest and the group interest 
in the VCM, the design of case (3) always attracts a lot of academic discussions. Therefore, in 
                                                          
2 Note that, here, I assume that the production function for building the road is 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥.  
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economics, when we talk about the problem of the VCM or the public goods game, we usually 
refer to the situation of case (3). 
 
1.2 Common-Pool Resources 
The common-pool resource refers to an open access resource. The classic example of the 
common-pool resources is the fishing ground. Consider an example of local fishery with 𝑛 
fishers. Assume that the number of fisher i’s fishing hours is 𝑥𝑖 and the output 𝑦 of the fishing 
ground is a function of the total number of hours of fishing, ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . That is 𝑦 = 𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), 
where 𝑓(. ) is an increasing, differentiable and strictly concave function. Therefore, the average 
output for each fishing hour is 𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Then, for fisher i, his/her expected output 
from his/her fishing hours 𝑥𝑖 is 𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝑥𝑖/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Furthermore, assume that the 
opportunity cost for each fishing hour is a positive constant 𝑐 and let 𝑤𝑖 denote the endowment 
of fishing hours for fisher i. Then, fisher i faces the following maximization problem. 
 
     𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖  𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑋−𝑖) = 𝑐(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖) +
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑋−𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑋−𝑖),                                                            (1.2) 
 
where 𝑋−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Then a list of inputs ?̂? = (?̂?1, ?̂?2, … , ?̂?𝑛) is a Nash equilibrium if, for all i, 
𝑣𝑖(?̂?𝑖 , ?̂?−𝑖) ≥ 𝑣𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , ?̂?−𝑖)  for all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑤𝑖], where ?̂?−𝑖 = ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Since all fishers have the 
symmetric value function 𝑣𝑖, in equilibrium, we get ?̂?1 = ?̂?2 = ⋯ = ?̂?𝑛. Therefore, from the 
first-order condition of the maximization problem (1.2), we can get, 
       
      𝑓′(?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?−𝑖) = 𝑛𝑐 − (𝑛 − 1)
𝑓(?̂?𝑖+?̂?−𝑖)
?̂?𝑖+?̂?−𝑖
,                                                                                               (1.3) 
 
         An important insight of this model is that each fisher in this situation has a strong 
incentive to obtain more and more resources, which finally results in an inefficient outcome or 
overexploitation of the CPR. To see this, we can consider that, if all fishers belong to a fishery 
company and their working hours is corresponding to the arrangement of the company. 
Assume that the opportunity cost for each fishing hour is a positive constant 𝑐 and let 𝑤 denote 
the endowment of fishing hours for the company. Then, the fishery company faces the 
following maximization problem. 
 
     𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑧 𝑐(𝑤 − 𝑧) + 𝑓(𝑧).                                                                                                             (1.4) 
 
9 
 
We can get the optimal choice ?̂? from the first-order condition of equation (1.4). It satisfies, 
  
     𝑓′( ?̂?) = 𝑐,                                                                                                                           (1.5) 
 
Then, we can compare two equations (1.3) and (1.5). Since the function 𝑓(. ) is a strictly concave 
function, we have ?̂? < ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?−𝑖 if 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 𝑐 <
𝑓(?̂?𝑖+?̂?−𝑖)
?̂?𝑖+?̂?−𝑖
 which is the participation constraint. 
Since ?̂? represents the optimal choice for the group of fishers, it is the efficient outcome. This 
simple result indicates that if 𝑛 ≥ 2, the sum of every fisher’s best choice will larger than the 
optimal choice for the group of fishers, which leads to a overexploitation problem for the CPR. 
This is called “the tragedy of the commons” (Harding, 1968). Therefore, in this situation, there 
is also a conflict between the individual interest and the group interest.  
 
1.3 Instability: Theoretical Implications 
Instability in games, in particular, in economics, refers to the convergence of an equilibrium, i.e. 
a Nash equilibrium. For example, when we say that a system is locally asymptotically stable, 
it indicates that, for an equilibrium of the system, all nearby solutions not only stay nearby 
but also tend to the equilibrium (see formal discussions and definitions in Chapter 2). 
Therefore, by contrast, if a system is not locally asymptotically stable, it informally means that 
all nearby solutions will not tend to the equilibrium. Related formal definitions with 
respect to different stability properties can be found in each chapter, before we discuss 
concrete theoretical predictions.   
        The theoretical argument of instability in the VCM and the CPR consists of three parts, 
respectively applied to three different settings: the VCM with homogeneous design, the VCM 
with heterogeneous design and the CPR. A notable difference between the VCM and the CPR 
is that different players might benefit differently from the common project in the VCM, but 
usually people benefit identically from the CPR since they can sell the resource in the 
downstream market. Therefore, the theoretical argument of instability is separately discussed 
in the homogeneous and heterogeneous designs. In the following, we explain them 
successively. 
        First, as I mentioned, in most previous experimental studies, researchers employ a linear 
payoff function (for a survey, see Ledyard, 1995). However, in most practical situations, the 
private good is money, hence its marginal return could be assumed as a constant, but the 
marginal return from a specific public good usually decreases as the level of the public good 
increases. Some researchers, therefore, pay much attention to this quasilinear payoff function 
in their investigation (for a survey, see Laury and Holt, 2008). If the payoff function is a 
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homogeneous quasilinear setting that is linear with respect to the private good and nonlinear 
with respect to the public good, it induces multiple static Nash equilibria.3 Saijo (2014) argues 
that all Nash equilibria are not asymptotically stable under the assumption of self-interested 
players and myopic best response dynamics in which players make best response to the last 
observation of their opponents’ actions. This leads to pulsing of contributions (alternating 
between contributing nothing and contributing everything). 
       Second, if the payoff function is a heterogeneous quasilinear setting that different 
players benefit differently from the public good, the multiple static Nash equilibria are 
degenerated to a unique Nash equilibrium (Bergstrom et al., 1986; Saijo, 2015). Under the same 
assumption of self-interested players and myopic best response dynamics, Saijo (2015) 
argues that, if the number of players exceeds two, there is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the global stability of the unique Nash equilibrium in this asymmetric environment. If the 
setting of the system does not satisfy this condition, the unique Nash equilibrium is non-
globally stable which indicates that the sequences start from some initial points will be pulsing 
after several periods between two contribution levels under the assumption of best response 
dynamics.   
        Third, still under the same assumption of self-interested players and myopic best 
response dynamics, Saijo et al. (2016) argue that, if the number of players exceeds two, there 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the local stability of the Nash equilibrium in the 
system of the CPR. Furthermore, this result indicates that, if the number of players is two, 
the difference equation system is always locally stable at the Nash equilibrium and if the 
number of players is at least four, then the difference equation system is always locally 
unstable at the Nash equilibrium. When n = 3, the stability is indeterminate. Moreover, when 
the system is locally unstable at the Nash equilibrium, the choices of player will be pulsing 
between two extraction levels. 
        Overall, all of these theoretical arguments are based on the assumption of self-interested 
players and best response dynamics. The result is that, if the setting of the system does not 
satisfy a particular condition, the contributions or the extraction levels will be pulsing, which 
indicates the Nash equilibrium in these games is not a good predictor for players’ decisions. 
Therefore, an obvious implication is that the Nash equilibrium is not a suitable standard of 
comparison for the empirical investigations in such the environments with the unstable 
settings.  
        However, although the Cournot best response dynamic is useful in the theoretical analysis, 
it is usually too strict to explain the experimental observations. First, players in the game might 
not be so myopic and forming their beliefs according to not only the last observation. Second, 
players might not be so self-interested; they might also care about the difference between 
                                                          
3 We will explain more details in chapter 2. 
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his/her own payoff and the other’s payoff. Therefore, to examine the assumptions the 
theoretical arguments that are based on those assumptions, a useful method is the 
methodology of experimental economics. In the next subsection, I will explain it and introduce 
some new insights in economics benefited from this methodology. 
 
1.4 Methodology of Experimental Economics       
Experimental economics as an empirical method is formally introduced by Vernon L. Smith in 
1970s (Plott and Smith, 2008). Due to this contribution, he has been awarded Nobel Prize in 
2002. Originally, he wants to investigate the predictions from the basic economic theory, i.e. 
supply and demand, market structure, using the experiment with human subjects. Since, in the 
design of lab experiments, experimenters can rule out all other factors that cannot be 
controlled in reality, the environment of lab experiments becomes a perfect place to test the 
prediction of economic theories with human subjects. 
         Since all economic theories are based on various assumptions, experimental method 
could be looked as a tool to examine the basic assumptions of economic theory. This might be 
the most important contribution of experimental economics to the economic theory. For 
example, since nineteenth century, a widely used assumption in various economic theories is 
the economic man that is a selfish and rational person in the economic environment. Under 
this widely accepted assumption, economics has achieved great success, especially, the wide 
use of game theory in economics. However, it also provides a lot of problem, i.e., charitable 
giving, that economic theory cannot explain. It seems that, although the assumption of 
economic man is important to economic theories, people in reality are not as selfish and 
rational as economists assumed. Then, experimental economics, due to its many advantages, 
provides very clean experimental evidence to show the distance between the theoretical 
predictions and the real performance of human subjects. Following the introduction of 
experimental economics, behavioral economics has been established. It changes the norm. The 
widely used assumption in behavioral economics is no longer the economic man but a social 
man with bounded rationality and social preferences. Therefore, behavioral economics 
becomes an inter-discipline interacting with psychology.  
        However, although the method of experimental economics is much like the method of 
experimental psychology, there are still some differences between these two disciplines. Let 
me manifest the methodology of experimental economics.  
        (i). Random Assignment. In experimental economics, likes the experimental psychology, the 
most important regulation or the basis of the empirical tests is the design of the random 
assignment in the experiment. This is the key step to control the unspecific factors in the 
experiment. Through random assigning subjects across treatments, the effects of unspecific 
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factors, i.e. the individual heterogeneity, could be averaged among treatments. Therefore, these 
unspecific factors cannot becomes an alternative explanation for the experimental results. 
        (ii). Anonymity. It is also like the experimental psychology. The identity of human subjects 
is classified in the experiments of experimental economics. Since the investigations in 
experimental economics usually focus on the decision-making in an environment of social 
interaction, through controlling the identity of subject, we can rule out the complex social 
intentions in the lab experiments and make clean the experimental data. 
        (iii). Incentive Compatibility. This might be the most important trait. Because of this, 
experimental economics is different from experimental psychology and surveying method that 
is the traditional empirical method in economics and sociology. The incentive compatibility 
indicates that the performance of human subjects should be consistent with the basis of 
rewards. It is also the basis of trustworthy for the experimental data. Human subjects make 
decisions in the experiments, because they want to get more and more rewards from the 
experiments. Therefore, it is a mechanism to ensure every decision could be considered as a 
true reflection of their intentions. A usual way of rewards is money, since money might be the 
item with the smallest individual heterogeneity in preference among human subjects. 
Obviously, if the experimenters can control the individual heterogeneity in the preference, 
anything could be used as a reward in the experiments. But, usually, in the experiment with 
student subjects, we use money. The incentive compatibility also indicates that subjects must 
be voluntarily participating in the experiments. If a subject is not voluntarily participating, the 
experimenter cannot make sure whether he/she cares about the rewards from the experiment. 
In other words, the experimental data from his/her decisions also cannot be trusted.   
        (iv). Faithfulness. This is another trait that is different from experimental psychology. The 
design of experiments in experimental economics requests a faithful formulation. The subjects 
should not be deceived during the experiments. Since most experimental studies in 
experimental economics investigate the economic decision-making, a faithful and coherence is 
necessary for subjects to connect decisions and outcomes during the experimental environment. 
Especially, for the repeated use of the subject pool and the lab, the reputation of the lab could 
significantly influence the experimental data of the successive experiments. 
        After explaining four basic traits in experimental economics, I will manifest the procedure 
of the experiments. Usually, the lab of experimental economics is equipped with one server 
and about twenty clients and each client locates in a closed chamber. A local network links all 
of these computers. The procedure of experimental treatments is programed by a computer 
software.4  
                                                          
4 Usually, it is Z-tree (see Fischbacher, 2007). Other network software is also useful, for example, the 
web server with PHP. 
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        When subjects are randomly chosen from the pool and enter the closed chambers, the 
experimenter should read loudly the instructions of the experiment. When every subject 
understands the meaning of the instructions, they are requested to answer the control 
questions. Through the answer of the control questions, the experimenters can identify 
whether a particular subject understands the rule of the experiment. If a subject does not seem 
well-understood, more private instructions are suitable. Furthermore, the answer of the control 
questions could also be a standard to select the experimental data.  
       The subjects usually are randomly assigned to a group with several persons in order to 
achieve the anonymity. And, no communication is allowed during the experiment. When the 
experiment is completed, each subject should be paid the rewards privately. All experimental 
data and material will be preserved for years.  
       After the collection of the experimental data, economists usually use the analysis tools 
from econometrics to analysis the data. It includes not only nonparametric statistic tests that 
are very common in the data analysis of experimental psychology, but also the regression 
models or other statistic models. These methods enrich the analysis of the experimental data. It 
allows the economists not only to identify the treatment effects of the experiment design, but 
also to investigate the particular reasoning behind the treatment effects. Therefore, 
experimental studies in experimental economics usually are plenty of insights.  
       In this thesis, I will employ the methodology of experimental economics to investigate not 
only the treatment effects but also the economic reasoning based on the theoretical arguments 
of instability in social dilemma games. The experimental investigations can provide an 
intuitive understanding of the distance between the theoretical results and the empirical 
results. Basically, I want to answer the questions how the theoretical reasoning fits the 
experimental data and whether the assumption behind the theory is suitable for analyzing the 
experimental data.     
 
1.5 Challenges to the methodology of Experimental Economics 
There are two main challenges to the methodology of Experimental Economics nowadays. One 
comes from the other traditional areas of Economics. The main criticism is that, the researches 
of Experimental Economics usually are conducted in a virtual environment. Although those 
unimportant influences could be eliminated in such an environment, there is a certain distance 
from the realistic economic decision-making environment. For example, a critical difference is 
that players in a virtual environment usually are unfamiliar with the decision environment 
they have to take time to understand and make trials in these environments created by 
economists, but in a realistic economic environment, the decision-makers usually are very 
familiar with surrounding economic environments, especially, some of them might have years 
of related experience. Such information or experience can significantly affect subjects’ risk 
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attitude (Harrison and List, 2004). This criticism seems very simple. However, it directly points 
out that the experimental observation in the lab experiments might not reflect the practice in 
reality, especially, in some researches regarding market structure and industry organization. 
Recently, an emerging discipline, called Field Experimental Economics, attempts to solve this 
criticism. The new discipline follows the related methodology of Experimental Economics, but 
conducts experiments in a more realistic environment. The researchers from this discipline 
make effort to render their experiments happened in a realistic environment which is very 
familiar to subjects.  
        The other challenge comes from natural science, especially, Biology and Neuroscience. For 
many years, Neuroscience and Psychology are gradually integrated together. The new 
disciplines, called Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Neuroscience start to investigate the 
neural basis behind human cognitive activities and social interactions. It is natural to see 
Neuroscience intrudes into Experimental Economics, since any economic decision is a 
consequence of brain activity. Without a basis of brain activity, any finding that deviated from 
the assumption of economic-man cannot be thoroughly understood (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). 
Therefore, a new discipline, called Neuroeconomics, has been established recently. It aims to 
investigate the neuro basis of human economic decision-making with the method of 
neuroscience. In such a discipline, the methodologies of Experimental Economics and 
Neuroscience are integrated together.    
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Chapter 2 
 
Instability in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with a 
Quasi-Linear Payoff Function 
       
 
2.1 Introduction 
Experimental economists have investigated the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
for many years for the purpose of understanding the public goods provision problem.5 
The linear payoff functions such as 𝑢(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦) = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑦, where xi is a private good of player i, 
y is a public good, and b is a positive constant is widely employed by most researchers in 
this field. However, a number of scholars argue that this setting cannot represent real-
world VCM environment because the self-interested choice (Nash equilibrium) and the 
optimal social choice are located at opposite boundaries of the feasible choice set (see, e.g., 
Sefton and Steinberg, 1996; Laury and Holt, 2008).  
        This problem could be mitigated by adopting quasi-linear payoff functions to make 
interior solutions for the self-interested and optimal social choices. In most real-world 
situations, the private good 𝑥𝑖 is money, the marginal return of which could be assumed to 
be constant. However, for a specific public good 𝑦, its marginal return is nonlinear. Thus, 
the first quasi-linear payoff function is, 𝜋(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦) = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑡(𝑦) (see Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and 
Walker, 1991; Sefton and Steinberg, 1996; Isaac and Walker, 1998; Laury et al., 1999; Hichri 
and Kirman, 2007). We refer to this as “QL1.” Conversely, one might consider a reverse 
case in which the marginal return of the payoff function is linear with respect to y and 
nonlinear with respect to 𝑥𝑖. Thus, that is 𝜋(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦) = ℎ(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑦 (see Sefton and Steinberg, 
1996; Keser, 1996; Falkinger et al., 2000; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 2001; van Dijk et al., 
2002; Uler, 2011; Maurice et al., 2013; Cason and Gangadharan, 2014). We refer to this as 
QL2. This payoff function could be employed to model a relatively rare situation that is 
the decrease (constant) of the marginal return of the private (public) good.  
         Different theoretical predictions are presented in these two designs. For the VCM with 
QL1, multiple static Nash equilibria coexist, which induces a coordination problem. 
Conversely, for the VCM with QL2, a unique dominant equilibrium exists, which is similar 
to the VCM with linear payoff functions. A previous study compared contribution levels 
                                                          
5 See Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for surveys on experiments regarding the VCM. 
Bergstrom et al. (1986) discuss the basic theoretical properties of the VCM. 
16 
 
between QL1 and QL2 environments (Sefton and Steinberg, 1996). They use a randomly 
re-matched group setting to suppress the feedback from the results of previous periods in 
the experiments. Theoretically, they argue that the presence of the coordination problem 
should be a reason for the fact that the average of individual contributions is significantly 
above the Nash equilibrium in their VCM experiment with QL1. However, their 
experimental results show a slight difference in contribution levels between the two 
experiments.  
        Differing from Sefton and Steinberg (1996), this study devotes to investigate the VCM 
experiments with QL1 and QL2 under a fixed group setting. Because the game is 
transformed into a super game in the fixed group setting, players might play strategically 
in the experiment (for details, see the discussions in Sefton and Steinberg, 1996). Moreover, 
Healy (2006) provides experimental evidence that subjects appear to best respond to recent 
observations in the VCM experiment with QL1 using a fixed group setting. This indicates 
that, in the fixed group setting, the feedback from preceding periods contributes to belief 
formation much more directly in the fixed group setting than it does in the randomly re-
matched group setting. 
        A recent study shows that all Nash equilibria are not asymptotically stable in the 
difference dynamic system of the VCM with QL1 under the assumptions of self-interested 
players and myopic best response dynamics (Saijo, 2014).6 This results in a pulse of 
contributions (alternating between some particular numbers). This dynamic analysis 
predicts that the coordination problem will be worsened by the feedback from repeated 
trials in the VCM with QL1. Furthermore, previous studies show that the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium is not a good predictor of individual contributions and that mean 
contributions also vary widely among individuals, even within a single experiment (Laury 
et al., 1999; Hichri and Kirman, 2007). The experimental observations and the theoretical 
instability argument suggest a complex interaction among subjects in the VCM experiment 
with QL1.  
       The instability arguments are experimentally discussed in the field of industrial 
organization (see Cox and Walker, 1998; Rassenti et al., 2000; Huck et al., 2002). However, 
those discussions differ from the current study. Andreoni (1995) points out that, subjects 
are called upon to generate positive externalities in the VCM environment, whereas they 
are asked to generate negative externalities in the experiment of oligopoly competition.7 
                                                          
6 An intuitive explanation of asymptotic stability is that an equilibrium ?̂? is asymptotically stable if 
all nearby solutions not only stay nearby but also tend to ?̂? (Hirsch and Smale, 1974, p. 180). We 
provide the formal definition of asymptotic stability in Section 2.2.   
7 The VCM experiments usually frame the subject’s choice as contributing to the provision of public 
goods, which could benefit other players within the group, whereas the oligopoly experiments 
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Different effects on cooperation will be induced by the positive and negative framing (see 
Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Cookson, 2000; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). 
Previous researchers have identified that cooperative behavior is widely observed in the 
VCM experiments (for a survey, see Chaudhuri, 2011). Therefore, the present study might 
provide an opportunity shedding light on the effect of instability in a cooperative 
environment.  
       More importantly, most experimental studies in the field of VCM experiment employ 
the linear payoff function, which might have failed to capture the real-world instability of 
the VCM. Therefore, this study aims to investigate that instability and provides dynamic 
analyses on the convergence of individual contributions in the VCM with QL1 using a 
fixed group setting. For the purpose of comparison, the results of the VCM experiment 
with QL2 serve as a reference.   
        Differing from the observation of a tiny difference between the QL1 and QL2 
environments with the randomly re-matched group setting in Sefton and Steinberg (1996), 
the experimental observations of our study show a significant difference in the 
convergence of individual contributions between the QL1 and QL2 environments with the 
fixed group setting.  Experimental evidence clearly shows that the decreasing dispersion 
of individual contributions and the diminishing the absolute changes of individual 
contributions in the experiment with QL2. 8 These observations indicate the convergence of 
individual contributions and suggest more and more steady individual contribution. In 
contrast, in the experiments with QL1, our observations show that the dispersion of 
individual contributions increases progressively and that individual contributions are still 
volatile in the experiments’ last periods, but we do not find a clearly unstable pulsing in 
the group’s total contribution. This indicates that individual contributions diverge. 
Therefore, the coordination problem is not alleviated and individual contributions are not 
converging to any equilibrium in the experiments with QL1. Our main result is that the 
experimental observations provide supporting evidence for the non-convergence of 
individual contributions in the QL1 environment using a fixed group setting, but there is 
still a significant distance between the theoretical instability argument and our 
experimental observations.  
       Moreover, our data show considerable cooperation across players in all experiments in 
line with the findings of previous studies. In each experiment, about 50 percent subjects 
could be regarded as typical conditional cooperators, and about 20 percent subjects are 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
usually frame the subject’s choice as providing a product, which will lower the market price and 
result in a disbenefit to others within the group. 
8 Absolute changes are the absolute values of the first-order differences of individual contributions. 
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weak free riders.9 Based on this observation, possible explanations are discussed for the 
distance between our theoretical predictions and the experimental observations in the 
conclusion.  
       The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes several 
theories concerning the VCM with QL1 and QL2. Section 2.3 presents our experimental 
design. Section 2.4 reports the experimental observations. Finally, the last section discusses 
the results and concludes the study. 
        
2.2 Theories of the VCM with QL1 and QL2 
2.2.1 VCM with QL1 
In an n-player VCM with QL1, all players are homogeneous and have the same payoff 
function and the same endowment E. Hence, a simple specification of the payoff is as 
follows: 
 
     𝜋𝑖 = 𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑎𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆
2,                                                                                                   (2.1) 
 
where a and b are positive constants, 𝑠𝑖 denotes the individual contribution of player i, 
and 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the group’s total contribution. More precisely, we assume that 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤
2𝑏𝑛𝐸 + 1, 
𝑎−1
2𝑛𝐸
≤ 𝑏, and 
𝑎−1
2𝑏𝑛
≤ 𝐸. For this simple game, a list of individual contributions ?̂? = 
(?̂?1, ?̂?2, ⋯ , ?̂?𝑛) is a Nash equilibrium if, for all i, 𝜋𝑖(?̂?𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) ≥ 𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0,  𝐸], 
where ?̂?−𝑖 = ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Therefore, from the first-order condition, the sum of Nash equilibrium 
contributions is  
 
     ?̂? =
𝑎−1
2𝑏
, ?̂? ∈ [0, 𝑛𝐸].                                                                                                         (2.2) 
 
Hence, any combination of individual contributions constitutes a static Nash equilibrium 
as long as the total contribution equals ?̂? (Bergstrom et al., 1986). 
                                                          
9 Typical conditional cooperators are those players who always try to match the average 
contribution of others in the previous period and whose contribution is insignificantly different 
from the average contribution of others. Weak free riders are those whose contribution is 
significantly below the average contribution of other players in the group and who are affected by 
the difference between their individual contributions and the average. 
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Anderson et al. (1998) introduce decision errors into this model. They find an 
interesting result. Although there is a continuum of Nash equilibria, a unique logit 
equilibrium exists that is symmetric across players. The equilibrium density is a (truncated 
at the boundary of the choice set) normal density for the quadratic public goods game (the 
VCM with QL1).10 Furthermore, they suggest that this model can easily be generalized to 
allow for individual differences in error parameters. The equilibrium thus becomes a 
unique asymmetric logit equilibrium. Moreover, the distribution is truncated by the 
boundary of the choice set, and the expected contribution of the logit equilibrium, 
therefore, is also sandwiched between the symmetric Nash equilibrium level and half of 
the endowment. These findings seem consistent with the experimental observations from 
Isaac and Walker (1998). The nature of this comparative static analysis is that the feedback 
from repeated trials will help subjects achieve the equilibrium consistency condition of the 
logit equilibrium and solve the coordination problem.11 
       However, this comparative static analysis is built on the assumption that the dynamic 
system of VCM is stable and converging to the unique logit equilibrium. If belief updating 
process cannot lead players to reach the equilibrium consistency condition of the logit 
equilibrium, this implies that the system is unstable, and the comparative static analysis 
might thus not be suitable.   
       Then, we show the dynamic analysis conducted by Saijo (2014) for exploring the 
equilibrium in the VCM with QL1. The best response function in the VCM with QL1 is as 
follows: 
  
     𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑚𝑎𝑥{− ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 + ?̂?, 0} , 𝐸},                                                                               (2.3) 
 
where ?̂? is the Nash prediction for the aggregate contribution given by equation (2.2) (see 
Bergstrom et al., 1986). The myopic Cournot best response dynamics indicates that player 
i’s contribution at period t directly responds to the total contribution of others in the group 
at period t-1. Hence, the best response function (2.3) then becomes 
 
     𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑚𝑎𝑥{− ∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗≠𝑖 + ?̂?, 0} , 𝐸}.                                                                         (2.4) 
                                                          
10 See Proposition 3 in Anderson et al. (1998). 
11 The equilibrium consistency condition is that player i’s expectations of other players’ actions are 
equal to the means of the actual equilibrium distributions (Anderson et al., 1998). 
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       Now, let us look at the stability property of this dynamic difference system. In the 
analysis, we employ the following definition of asymptotic stability. 
 
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium 𝑥 is locally asymptotically stable, if and only if there exists 
some open neighborhood 𝑂 of 𝑥 such that, for any 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑥𝑡 converges to 𝑥 as 𝑡 
approaches infinity.  
 
The following property is useful to decide whether the Nash equilibria in the difference 
equation system of equation (2.4) are asymptotically stable (see Bischi et al., 2009; Saijo, 
2014).  
 
Property 2.1. Let k be the slope of the best response function at the Nash equilibrium. The 
system 𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑟(𝑠−𝑖
𝑡−1), (i = 1, 2, ..., n), is locally asymptotically stable if and only if |k(n −
1)| < 1.  
 
Because the slope of equation (2.4) is -1 and n-1≮1 if n≥2, all equilibria are not locally 
asymptotically stable. This indicates that, under the assumptions of self-interested subjects 
and myopic best response, contributions will alternate between contributing nothing and 
contributing everything after a few rounds (if ?̂? ≥ 𝐸) in a simultaneous difference equation 
system of the VCM with QL1. The nature of this theoretical result is that the feedback from 
repeated trials will not alleviate the coordination problem, but worsen it. This insight 
implies the possibility that the dynamic difference system of a VCM experiment with QL1 
is unstable. 
 
2.2.2 VCM with QL2 
In an n-player VCM with QL2, a simple quadratic payoff function could be given as 
follows: 
 
    𝜋𝑖 = 𝑐(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) − 𝑑(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖)
2 + 𝑆,                                                                                     (2.5) 
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where 1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 2𝑑𝐸 + 1, 
𝑐−1
2𝐸
≤ 𝑑, and 
𝑐−1
2𝑑
≤ 𝐸. Then, from the first-order condition, we can 
get a dominant Nash equilibrium solution for every player 
 
    ?̂? =
1−𝑐
2𝑑
+ 𝐸, ?̂? ∈ [0, 𝐸].                                                                                               (2.6) 
 
Therefore, due to a unique dominant equilibrium, the VCM environment with QL2 is 
similar to the VCM with linear payoff functions. The only difference is the location of the 
equilibrium in the choice set. Anderson et al. (1998) also introduce decision errors into the 
quadratic model of the VCM with QL2. They suggest that the decision error should 
partially explain excessive giving when the Nash equilibrium is less than half of the 
endowment, because the distribution of the logit equilibrium is also truncated by the 
boundary of the choice set. Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001) provide experimental 
evidence supporting this theoretical result.   
 
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
We conducted the experiments at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Lab at 
Shanghai Jiaotong University (SJTU) in March 2015 (192 subjects) and March 2017 (96 
subjects). The subjects were recruited among SJTU students excluding those from the 
Department of Economics and Management. Subjects participated voluntarily and had no 
experience of VCM experiments using nonlinear payoff structures. The experiments 
consisted of 12 sessions. For each session, we recruited more than 30 subjects. We then 
used a lottery to select the participants. 24 subjects were selected in each session, and we 
paid a show-up fee to the rest. We used z-Tree to run the experiments (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters of our experiments.12 Four different experiments 
are implemented. Three of these (QL1N, QL1P, and QL1M) employ payoffs based on QL1, 
which is linear with respect to the private good and nonlinear with respect to the public 
good, while QL2N is based on QL2, which is linear in the public good and nonlinear in the 
private good.  
                                                          
12 Payoff lists and instructions translated from the Chinese version can be found among the 
supplementary documents. We also present graphs for the relation between returns and tokens for 
each account and clearly display which part indicates diminishing marginal returns. This makes 
our design close to the detailed information (DET) experiments in Laury et al. (1999). 
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Consistent with the design of Sefton and Steinberg (1996), we set the following 
consistency conditions for the two experiments with nonlinear designs (QL1N and QL2N): 
1. The same (symmetric) equilibrium contribution of two tokens per individual. 
2. The same (symmetric) socially optimal contribution of six tokens per individual. 
3. The approximately equal reward from (symmetric) equilibrium play. 
4. The approximately equal reward from (symmetric) socially optimal play.13 
 
Table 2.1 Parameters of the experiments 
Experiments                              QL1N                    QL1P                      QL1M                    QL2N 
Payoff function                          QL1N:  (𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) + 1.4484𝑆 − 0.0137(𝑆)
2 + 28 
                     QL1P and QL1M: {
10(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) + 15𝑆, 𝑆 ≤ 16; 
10(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) + 5(𝑆 − 16) + 240, 16 < 𝑆 ≤ 48;  
10(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) + (𝑆 − 48) + 400, 48 < 𝑆 ≤ 64.
 
                     QL2N:  11.5(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖) − 0.875(𝐸 − 𝑠𝑖)
2 + 𝑆 
Endowment (Tokens)                    8                           8                               8                             8 
Additional payment (E$)             28                          0                               0                             0 
(symmetric) 
Nash choice ŝ (Payoff)                 2(53.7)                2(300)                      2(300)                    2(53.5) 
(symmetric) 
Socially optimal s∗(Payoff)          6(68)                   6(420)                     6(420)                     6(67.5) 
Payment ratio                                 22:1                    110:1                       110:1                        22:1 
Periods                             15(Random ending)         30                            30               15(Random ending) 
Groups/Subjects                           12/96                  6/48                       6/48                        12/96 
 𝑠𝑖 denotes the individual contribution of player i; E represents the endowments; and S denotes the group’s 
total contribution. 
     
       However, our experimental design differs from that of Sefton and Steinberg (1996) in 
two crucial ways. First, our design employs an eight-player fixed group setting. In the 
                                                          
13 We set an additional payment to make the rewards from equilibrium play and socially optimal 
play approximately equal between the two experiments. 
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design of Sefton and Steinberg (1996), four individuals are randomly allocated to a group 
at the beginning of each period. We use a relatively large group, following Ostrom et al. 
(1992), who use an eight-player group setting to study common pool resource 
environments (see Chapter 4 for more details).  
        Second, because setting the coefficient of linear returns to be equal to one could be 
easier for subjects to understand the nonlinear return structure in the payoff table, we do 
not consider the 5th symmetric condition in Sefton and Steinberg (1996)—the same 
monetary loss from a one-token unilateral departure from equilibrium play. This design 
results in the opportunity costs among choices in the QL1N experiment are significantly 
lower than those in the QL2N experiment. As Smith and Walker (1993) shown, the 
opportunity costs among choices directly affect the dispersion of individual choices in 
experiments. Therefore, the relatively small opportunity costs might influence the 
convergence of choices.14 To ensure that our experimental observations do not originate 
from the design of relatively small opportunity costs, we implement the other two 
experiments (QL1P and QL1M) for robustness checks. The QL1P experiment employs a 
piecewise linear payoff function as the linear approximation for the nonlinear returns from 
the public good (similar to the payoff design in Cason and Gangadharan, 2014). The 
opportunity costs are also increased among choices.15 The QL1M experiment utilizes the 
same payoff function as that used in the QL1P experiment but with a different the payoff 
table in the instructions. The new payoff table uses a matrix to directly connect the choices 
to the payoffs (see, e.g., the design of payoff tables in Cason et al., 2004).  
 
The experiments with QL1 
 
The QL2N experiment 
                                                          
14 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
15 Different from the QL1N experiment, we remove the fixed payment in each period and boost the 
magnitude of experimental payoffs by 10 times, but the exchange ratio from experimental dollars to 
real money increases by only five times (from 22:1 to 110:1) in the QL1P and QL1M experiments. 
For the choices around the Nash equilibrium, the opportunity cost in the piecewise linear design is 
significantly greater than is that in the nonlinear design.   
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Fig. 2.1 Stability property of the design 
 
       We draw the best response curves for the two environments to clearly illustrate the 
stability property of our design. In Figure 1, the horizontal axis is the total contribution of 
others in the group, and the vertical axis represents player i’s own contribution. For the 
three experiments with QL1, the myopic Cournot response curve (the bold black line “f-w-
j-h”) is 
  
    𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = min{max{− ∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗≠𝑖 + 16,  0},  8}.                                                                       (2.7)  
    
For example, suppose that every player’s initial contribution is the same at a/7, which 
implies that the total contribution of others is initially “a.” Obviously, the best response to 
“a” is point “b.” Then, if players are symmetric, the total contribution of others goes to “c.” 
Then, we find the best response to “b” is point “d,” that to “d” is point “f,” and that to “f” 
is point “h.” Finally, the dynamic difference system will be pulsing between point “f” and 
point “h.” This example shows that, under the assumption of Cournot best response 
dynamics, the contributions of subjects will be pulsing between 0 and 8 after a few rounds. 
However, for the QL2N experiment, this curve is derived simply as follows: 
   
    𝑠𝑖
𝑡 = 2.                                                                                                                               (2.8) 
 
Therefore, the best response to any case is contributing two tokens. Given these theoretical 
results, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1. In the experiment with QL2 (QL2N), individual contributions will 
converge to the unique Nash equilibrium, which indicates that (i) the dispersion of 
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individual contributions decreases and (ii) individual contributions become steady with 
repeated trials. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2. In the experiments with QL1 (QL1N, QL1P, and QL1M), individual 
contributions will not converge to the symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibria, which 
indicates that (i) the group’s total contribution will be pulsing round after round (the 
sample autocorrelation statistic should be negative), (ii) the dispersion of individual 
contributions might not decrease because of the intergroup level heterogeneity, and (iii) 
individual contributions will be volatile even in the last periods.    
 
        For each session in the QL1N and QL2N experiments, we implement the experiment 
with a random ending rule. Subjects were certain to participate in the first 15 periods. 
From the beginning of the 16th period, the experiment would continue with a probability 
of 0.3. This setting helps to suppress strategic play (e.g., the endgame effect) in a repeated 
game with the fixed group setting.16 Data from the first 15 rounds were used for analysis. 
Furthermore, to show more information regarding the convergence of contributing 
behavior, the public goods game repeated 30 periods in each session of the QL1P and 
QL1M experiments. Since these two experiments serve as robustness checks for the 
observations from QL1N experiments, we have the following third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3. The dynamic patterns of contributions (concerning dispersion and 
contribution volatility) should not be significantly different among the QL1N, QL1P, and 
QL1M experiments.  
 
At the beginning of each period, each subject receives eight tokens. They are called 
upon to allocate these tokens into two accounts: the private account and the public account. 
All tokens have to be allocated in each period without communication with others, and the 
feasible choice set is {0,1, … ,7,8}. Each token in the private account produces a private 
return to oneself. Each token in the public account produces a public return to each 
member of the group. The framing of instructions was similar to that of Sefton and 
Steinberg (1996) and consistent across experiments. 
                                                          
16 See Dal B o´ (2005). However, other studies find no significant difference between the finite period 
setting and the random terminated setting (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Engle-Warnick and 
Slonim, 2004). 
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        At the end of each period, the result of that period is reported to each subject. The 
report consists of three parts: each subject’s own decisions, the total tokens in the public 
account, and his/her own payoff. No subject can observe the individual contributions of 
other members of the same group. This incomplete information setting is consistent with 
most studies of the literature on VCM experiments.  
        The instructions are distributed to each one, at the time when all 24 subjects enter the 
lab in each session. At the beginning of each session, a native speaking research assistant 
reads the instruction loudly. Then, control questions are required to be answered correctly 
to ensure that every subject understands the experimental procedure. At the end of each 
session, each subject receives his/her payment privately at a preannounced exchange rate 
of 22 experimental dollars (E$) to 1 Chinese RMB in the QL1N and QL2N experiments and 
110 experimental dollars (E$) to 1 Chinese RMB in the QL1P and QL1M experiments. The 
192 subjects earn RMB 44.5 (7.5 US dollars) each on average, with a range of RMB 36 to 
RMB 47 in the QL1N and QL2N experiments and the 96 subjects earn RMB 94 (15 US 
dollars) each on average, with a range of RMB 80 to RMB 108 in the QL1P and QL1M 
experiments. Each session lasts about one hour and a half, including the instruction and 
payment distribution time. 
 
2.4 Results  
This section consists of four subsections. The first gives an overview for the experimental 
data. The second investigates the dispersion of individual contributions. The third shows 
the dynamics of changes in individual contributions. The final subsection investigates the 
conditional cooperation in the four experiments and roughly categorizes subjects.    
 
2.4.1 Overview 
First, we present an overview of individual contributions. Figure 2.2 shows the average 
contributions at each period for the four experiments. A decreasing tendency of average 
contributions is shared by the four experiments. Individual contributions from periods 11 
to 15 are significantly lower than those from periods 1 to 5 in both the QL1N and QL2N 
experiments (p-values = 0.0000 by the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) and that individual 
contributions from periods 21 to 30 are significantly lower than those from periods 1 to 10 
in both the QL1P (p-value = 0.0171) and QL1M (p-value = 0.0000) experiments.17  
                                                          
17 For all Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in this paper, we first compute two averages across periods 1 
to 5 and 11 to 15 for each subject in the QL1N and QL2N experiments and across periods 1 to 10 
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Fig. 2.2 Average contributions in the four experiments 
  
        Second, we show an overview of the group’s total contributions. Figure 2.3 shows 
time series plots of the group’s total contributions. It clearly shows that the total 
contributions of all groups are significantly above the Nash prediction. This observation 
indicates the presence of cooperation. The corresponding sample autocorrelation statistics 
(α) of each group are reported in Table 2.2. They are positive for all groups. There is a 
slight difference in autocorrelation statistics between the QL1N and QL2N experiments (p-
value = 0.0781 by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Figure 2.3 shows that the group’s total 
contribution is pulsing more in some groups in the QL1N experiment than in the QL2N 
experiment. However, the unstable pulsing seems to have been greatly smoothed 
compared to the prediction of instability in Saijo (2014). According to the theoretical 
prediction, serial correlation should be negative in the experiments with QL1. These 
observations reject the first prediction of hypothesis 2.2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and 21 to 30 for each subject in the QL1P and QL1M experiments. Then, we conduct the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests over two samples of averages to eliminate correlation across periods.  
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Panel A: The three experiments with QL1 
 
 
Panel B: The QL2N experiment 
 
Fig. 2.3 Time series plots of groups’ total contributions 
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Table 2.2 Sample autocorrelation statistics of group’s total contributions 
The QL1N experiment 
   Group          1          2          3         4         5          6        7         8         9        10       11       12 
     α               0.43    0.27     0.21     0.39    0.55    0.27    0.18    0.11    0.03    0.33    0.53    0.34 
 
The QL1P experiment 
Group      1           2            3           4            5           6 
    α         0.68      0.62      0.83      0.71       0.41      0.65 
 
The QL1M experiment 
Group       1          2           3            4             5          6 
    α         0.42      0.47      0.29      0.68        0.35      0.53 
 
The QL2N experiment 
  Group      1         2         3         4         5        6         7         8          9       10       11       12 
  α            0.45    0.37    0.10    0.65    0.48    0.56    0.53    0.57    0.45    0.38    0.36    0.09 
 
 
2.4.2 Dispersion 
In this subsection, we show the dynamics of dispersion in the four experiments. A 
common way to do this in statistics is to use the coefficient of variation to compare 
dispersion between two samples with different averages. However, in this study, we focus 
on the dispersion of choices rather than the dispersion of numbers. In this context, each 
number of contributions represents each position of actions in the choice set. Hence, two 
contribution samples of {0,0,1,1,2,2,3,3} and {5,5,6,6,7,7,8,8} share an identical dispersion 
although their averages are different. Therefore, we still use the standard deviation as a 
measure of dispersion.      
 
Result 2.1 (Dispersion): Although average contributions are declining in all four 
experiments, the standard deviation of individual contributions is ascending in the three 
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experiments with QL1 at the aggregate level, whereas it is descending in the QL2N 
experiment. The ascending standard deviation of individual contributions at the aggregate 
level stems from the intragroup level in the three experiments with QL1. 
 
Support: Figure 2.4 shows the dynamic tendency of the standard deviations of individual 
contributions for the four experiments. The Spearman’s rank correlation tests reveal an 
ascending tendency shared by the three experiments with QL1 (ρ = 0.7857, p-value < 
0.001 for QL1N; ρ = 0.7130, p-value < 0.001 for QL1P; ρ = 0.7433, p-value < 0.001 for 
QL1M), yet a descending tendency appears in the QL2N experiment (ρ = −0.9464, p-value 
< 0.001).  
   
 
Fig. 2.4 Standard deviation of individual contributions 
    
       Figure 2.5 shows time series plots of the standard deviation at the group level in the 
four experiments. In the three experiments with QL1, eight out of 12 groups from the 
QL1N experiment, three out of six groups from the QL1P experiment, and five out of six 
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groups from the QL1M experiment share a significantly increasing pattern (p-values < 0.1 
for 16 groups; p-values < 0.05 for 11 groups by the Spearman’s rank correlation tests); and 
no group shows a significantly decreasing pattern. By contrast, eight out of 12 groups 
share a significantly decreasing pattern (p-values < 0.05), and no group shows a 
significantly increasing pattern in the QL2N experiment.  
 
Panel A: The three experiments with QL1 
 
 
Panel B: The QL2N experiment 
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Fig. 2.5 Time series plots of standard deviations in groups 
 
        To sum up, the observation that the standard deviation of individual contributions is 
ascending at the aggregate level emerges from the intragroup level in the three 
experiments with QL1. This observation does not support that individual contributions are 
converging to a symmetric equilibrium in the experiments with QL1. However, we also 
notice that the increasing dispersion at the aggregate level stems mainly from the 
intragroup level rather than the intergroup level.18 This observation is inconsistent with 
the reasoning of the second prediction of hypothesis 2.2.  
        Therefore, Result 2.1 supports the first prediction of hypothesis 2.1, but rejects the the 
second prediction of hypothesis 2.2. Furthermore, the observation that all the three 
experiments with QL1 share similar dynamics of dispersion supports hypothesis 2.3. 
      
2.4.3 Absolute Changes in Individual Contribution 
We use the absolute value of the first-order difference of individual contributions (|si
t −
si
t−1|, t ≥ 2; hereafter “AVFD”) to measure the pulsing of individual contributions. If the 
dynamic system is approaching an equilibrium, the degree of contribution pulsing, the 
AVFD, on average will diminish.  
 
                                                          
18 We also check the dynamical tendency of the standard deviation of the group’s total 
contributions across periods in the four experiments. The Spearman’s rank correlation tests show 
that ρ = 0.2536 and p-value = 0.3618 for QL1N, ρ = 0.5537 and p-value = 0.0015 for QL1P, ρ =
0.0007 and p-value = 0.9972 for QL1M, and ρ = −0.6643 and p-value = 0.0069 for QL2N. These 
results indicate that, in two of the three experiments with QL1, the dispersion at the intergroup 
level does not increase with repeated trials.  
33 
 
Result 2.2 (Absolute changes): The absolute changes on average are diminishing in the 
QL1P and QL2N experiments. In the QL1N and QL1M experiments, however, they do not 
decline relative to the beginning of the experiment.   
 
Support: Figure 2.6 shows the dynamic tendency of the average of AVFDs for the four 
experiments. Comparing sample 1 (the AVFDs from periods 2 to 6) with sample 2 (the 
AVFDs from periods 11 to 15), the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows a significant decrease 
in the QL2N experiment (p-value = 0.0000), but an insignificant result for the QL1N 
experiment (p-value = 0.1312). Furthermore, for the QL1P and QL1M experiments, 
comparing sample 1 (the AVFDs from periods 2 to 11) with sample 2 (the AVFDs from 
periods 21 to 30), the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows a significant decrease in the QL1P 
experiment (p-value = 0.0012), yet an insignificant result for the QL1M experiment (p-
value = 0.4817). Although there is also a decreasing tendency in the QL1P experiment, the 
AVFDs in the last 10 periods of the QL1P experiment are still significantly larger than 
those in the last five periods of the QL2N experiment (p-value = 0.0124, by the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test).    
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Fig. 2.6 Average of AVFDs at each period 
 
        Combined with the observations in the previous subsection, the decreasing AVFDs in 
the QL2N experiment indicate that the experimental system is converging to the dominant 
equilibrium, which is symmetric across players. Conversely, the decreasing AVFDs in the 
QL1P experiment might indicate that some groups in the experiments with QL1 are 
converging to some asymmetric equilibrium. Therefore, we further check the AVFDs at 
the group level. Comparing sample 1 with sample 2 in each group of the three 
experiments with QL1 reveals a significant decrease in four groups (p-value = 0.0138 for 
group 10 in the QL1N experiment; p-value = 0.0117 for group 2 and p-value = 0.0687 for 
group 4 in the QL1P experiment; and p-value = 0.0929 for group 1 in the QL1M 
experiment). However, after checking the individual data in these four groups, we find 
that the individual contributions of a part of the group members are still volatile in the last 
periods of the experiment. This is not compatible with the fact that the experimental 
dynamic system is converging to a static asymmetric equilibrium.  
Therefore, Result 2.2 supports the second prediction of hypothesis 2.1 and the group 
level observations also support the third prediction of hypothesis 2.2. Furthermore, 
although the observation in the QL1P experiment at the aggregate level is different from 
those in the other two experiments with QL1, the group level observations show that 
individual contributions are volatile in the last periods of all the three experiments with 
QL1. This is consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2.3.  
        Overall, our experimental data reveal a clear dynamic pattern showing that 
contributions are converging to the static equilibrium in the QL2N experiment. By contrast, 
our observations do not suggest the existence of a process that the dynamic system is 
approaching a symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium and that the coordination problem is 
alleviated in the three experiments with QL1. However, we also notice that there are some 
observations that cannot be explained by our instability theory. For example, there is not a 
significant pulsing in the group’s total contributions in the three experiments with QL1 
and the increasing dispersion of individual contribution comes mainly from the 
intragroup level. Therefore, in the following subsection, we investigate the heterogeneity 
among individuals in order to generate insights concerning these observations via a 
categorization of the subjects.      
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2.4.4 Conditional Cooperation 
In the VCM experiments with linear payoff functions, players are often classified into 
several categories. The three most common categories are free riders, conditional 
cooperators, and unconditional cooperators. Usually, free riders account for only around 
20 percent of the total population. However, conditional cooperators account for around 
50 percent (see Fischbacher et al., 2001; Sonnemans et al., 1999; Keser and van Winden, 
2000; for a survey, see Chaudhuri, 2011). These findings indicate that the experimental 
environment is much more complex than the assumption in Saijo (2014) implies. 
Furthermore, the previous study, Laury et al. (1999), finds that, in the QL1 environment, 
average contributions varied widely among individuals, even within a single experiment. 
This might imply that there is a systematic difference in the motivation of cooperation 
between the experiments with QL1 and QL2.19 In this subsection, we attempt to investigate 
the conditional cooperation from a myopic perspective to see whether there is a systematic 
difference in conditional cooperation across the experiments. 
        The individual decision rule is assumed to take the following form to isolate the 
motivation of conditional cooperation.  
 
     𝑠𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖
𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑠𝑖
𝑡−1 −
1
7
∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗≠𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑡 ≥ 2,                                                  (2.9) 
  
where εi is the residual term of player i. Equation (2.9) is estimated using the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) for each group of eight players in the four experiments. In 
this regression (2.9), −
𝛼𝑖
𝛽𝑖
 approximately denotes the overall distance between player i’s 
contribution and the average contribution of other players in the group. Thus, two aspects 
of the subjects’ contribution behavior could be identified by this regression. First, it shows 
how many players are reacting to the difference between their own contribution and the 
average contribution of others (or how many players try to match the average contribution 
of others in the previous period). Second, It identifies the overall distance between player 
i’s contribution and the average contribution of other players. αi > 0 and βi < 0 indicate 
that subject i’s contribution is significantly above the average contribution of other players 
in the group and is also affected by the difference between his/her contribution and the 
average. This result means that this subject is a weak unconditional cooperator (WUC).20 In 
                                                          
19 Here, the term “systematic difference in the motivation for cooperation” is used to indicate the 
difference in the distribution among different types of subjects. 
20 We call them “weak unconditional cooperators” to distinguish them from those unconditional 
cooperators who always contribute six tokens throughout the experiment. 
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turn, αi < 0 and βi < 0 indicate a weak free rider (WFR). A typical conditional cooperator 
(TCC) should have αi = 0 and βi < 0, which implies that player i always tries to match the 
average contribution of others in the previous period and his/her contribution is 
insignificantly different from the average contribution of others. Moreover, unconditional 
cooperators (UC) are those who persisted in contributing a fixed number of at least six 
tokens; conversely, free riders (FR) are those who persisted in contributing a fixed number 
of no more than two tokens. Hence, through examining αi and βi, we can roughly classify 
all subjects into six categories.21     
 
Result 2.3 (Conditional cooperation): No systematic difference in conditional cooperation 
is observed across the four experiments. The individual estimates from the SUR show that 
around 50 percent of the players could be categorized as typical conditional cooperators; 
weak free riders and weak unconditional cooperators each account for about 20 percent of 
the total population in all experiments.  
 
Support: Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the SUR. Briefly, by comparing the number 
and proportion of subjects of each type, we have not found a systematic difference in 
conditional cooperation across the four experiments. In all experiments, almost half of the 
players could be regarded as typical conditional cooperators, while weak free riders and 
weak unconditional cooperators each account for about 20 percent of the total population. 
This result is consistent with the previous findings in the linear environment of the VCM 
experiments. The existence of a considerable proportion of conditional cooperators might 
be a reason for the smoothed pulsing in the group’s total contribution in the experiments 
with QL1. 
     
 Table 2.3 Conditional cooperation 
Form                                    si
t − si
t−1 = αi + βi (si
t−1 −
1
7
∑ sj
t−1
j≠i ) + εi, t ≥ 2     
Individual results 
  Category                         QL1N (96 subjects)   QL1P (48 subjects)  QL1M (48 subjects)  QL2N (96 subjects)                             
                                                          
21 There is one subject from the QL1N experiment who should be classified as αi < 0 and βi = 0. 
Because p-value = 0.049 for αi < 0 and only one observation is considered, we take this observation 
as an unimportant exception and assign this subject into category αi = 0 and βi = 0. 
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  UC                                                    3 (3%)𝑏                   1 (2%)                         2 (4%)                      1 (1%) 
WUC (αi > 0 and βi < 0
𝑎)             19 (20%)                 11 (21%)                      7 (15%)                    17 (18%) 
 TCC (αi = 0 and βi < 0)                 40 (42%)                21 (44%)                      27 (56%)                   48 (50%) 
 WFR (αi < 0 and βi < 0)                21 (22%)                11 (23%)                      11 (23%)                    20 (21%) 
   FR                                                    1 (1%)                     0 (0%)                          0 (0%)                       5 (5%) 
 Unclassified (αi = 0 and βi = 0)   12 (12%)                 4 (8%)                           1 (2%)                       5 (5%) 
   a Both αi and βi of individual regressions (SUR) are judged by a two-tailed test at the 5% significance level 
(the null hypotheses are 𝛼𝑖 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖 = 0).  
   b Percentages of the total population are reported in parentheses.  
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
In this study, we conducted experiments to investigate the dynamic patterns of 
contributing behavior in the VCM with two quasi-linear payoff functions. We find clear 
evidence indicating that the system is converging to the dominant equilibrium in the 
QL2N experiment. Individual contributions decrease and converge with repeated trials, 
and become steady. By contrast, in the experiments with QL1, although contributions on 
average are also decreasing with no clearly unstable pulsing in the group’s total 
contributions, individual contributions diverge and change continuously.  
       These observations do not support that the dynamic system of the VCM with QL1 is 
converging to an equilibrium, indicating that a comparative static analysis alone might not 
be suitable for the VCM with QL1 using a fixed group setting. On the other hand, our 
observation is consistent with the finding of previous studies on the VCM experiments 
with linear payoff functions. That is, most players in the lab VCM experiment follow the 
decision rule of conditional cooperators. This might constitute a reason for the growing 
dispersion we observed in the three experiments with QL1.   
       Consider a repeated VCM game with two types of players—free riders and 
conditional cooperators. The decay of the average contribution could be explained by the 
classical scenario of the interaction between free riders and conditional cooperators if the 
game has a dominant strategy, such as that of a linear environment. Once the conditional 
cooperators become frustrated by free riding, they start reducing their contributions. Then, 
the average contribution becomes close to the dominant equilibrium. Our experimental 
evidence suggest that this may also be true in the VCM experiment with QL2 in which 
there is a dominant equilibrium. 
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       In contrast, in the three experiments with QL1, the observations of the dispersion and 
the absolute changes indirectly suggest another possible interpretation of the interaction 
between free riders and conditional cooperators in the VCM experiment with QL1. When 
conditional cooperators become frustrated by free riding, they will reduce their 
contributions to a certain level. The free riders may then have to increase their contribution 
to increase their payoffs if they expect that the total contribution of others will become less 
than the sum of the Nash equilibrium contributions. When the conditional cooperators 
find that the total contribution is increasing, they will seek to sustain this total contribution 
level. However, the free riders will then begin to free ride again, and a new round of the 
decreasing total contribution will begin. We thus conjecture that starting from the dynamic 
analysis of Saijo (2014) and incorporating the interaction between several different types of 
players might offer insights into the ascending dispersion we observed in this study.       
       Finally, two empirical implications of our experimental observations are worth 
mentioning. First, the growing dispersion indicates that the stability property of the 
mechanism itself might also be a reason for the diversity of individual contributions, in 
addition to the social preference heterogeneity among the players. Second, and more 
importantly, the experimental observation of non-convergence indicates that the Nash 
equilibrium might not be a suitable theoretical benchmark to use in empirical analyses of 
the real-world VCM environment if the system is not converging to it. 
 
Supplementary Documents 
Instructions and payoff tables in our experiments. 
There are four sets of instructions and payoff tables in this supplementary document.  
The QL1N experiment, the QL1P experiment, the QL1M experiment, and the QL2N experiment. 
 
 (The QL1N experiment) 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment concerning economic decision-making. At the end of today's 
session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is essential that you remain silent and do not 
watch at other people's decisions. Please shut down your cell phone and don’t talk with others. 
If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand. If you 
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exclaim out loudly or violate any of the rules explained below, you may be asked to leave and 
will not be paid. This is necessary for our experiment. 
We thank you very much for your cooperation in this regard. 
 
Overview 
 
There will be at least 15 decision-making rounds in this experiment. You will each make 
a decision in each of these rounds. When the first 15 rounds are finished, the experiment will 
continue with a probability of 30%. In other words, the experiment will be directly terminated 
with a probability of 70%. At the end of each round, you will be informed your earnings for 
that round on the PC screen. The rules are similar in every round.  
In the first round, you will be randomly assigned to a group. Each group consists of eight 
members. The composition of your group will be fixed throughout the experiment. You will 
not know which of the other people in the lab are in your group in any given round. You will 
be paid the total of your earnings of all rounds at the end of today's session. 
 
Rules 
 
         In each round, you have eight tokens to allocate. You must decide the number of tokens 
to place into either or both of two accounts: a private account and a group account. All tokens 
must be placed in one account or the other. Each token you placed in the private account 
generates a return to you (and to you alone), and each token you placed in the group account 
generates a return to every member of your group. Returns from the two accounts are listed in 
the Earning Tables. Everybody has the exact identical Earning Tables. When the experiment 
begins, you need to enter your decisions in blanks on the screen. Your entries on the blanks 
must be whole numbers between 0 and 8 and must be summed to be 8. 
After everyone has made a decision, the computer will compute the total number of 
tokens placed in the group account for your group in this round, and prepare a “Report to 
Subject” for each of you. You can record the number that the computer has reported on the line 
entitled "Total Number of Tokens Placed By Your Group in Your Group Account was" and 
compute your earnings. Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings from the 
private account, your earnings from the group account, and an additional fixed payoff 28 E$. 
To determine your earnings from the private account, you need to find the number from the 
column headed "Private Account(E − xi)” and “Private return (E$)” on the Earning Tables, 
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according to your decisions. To determine your earnings from the group account, you need to 
find the correct number in the column headed “Group account (∑ x)” and “Individual return 
from the group account (E$)” on the Earning Tables. This part reports the amount you will 
earn from the group account. Your total payoff will be reported on the PC screen 
corresponding to the number of tokens you have placed in your private account and your 
group has placed in the group account in that round.  
          Next, you should check to see if your calculation is consistent with the computer’s report 
on the screen. It is extremely important that we both make this calculation and the results are 
consistent. If your calculation differs from the computer’s or if you are unsure on how to 
compute your earnings in any round, please raise your hand. When all things are correct, the 
next round will begin. 
         Finally, at the end of experiment, the earnings you have gotten in today’s session will be 
exchanged for Chinese yuan at an exchange rate of 22:1. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
(1) All subjects have the same Earning Tables. 
(2) This session will comprise of at least 15 rounds. From 16th round, the experiment will 
continue with a probability of 30%. 
(3) In each round, you and other members of your group will each have 8 tokens to allocate. 
(4) In each round, you should decide the number of tokens to place in your private account 
and the number of tokens to place in your group account. You must distribute all 8 tokens in 
each round.  
(5) Your earnings from the private account depend only on your decision (the number of 
tokens that you placed in the account). 
(6) Your earnings from the group account depend upon the total number of tokens your group 
placed in this account.  
(7) The members in your group will be fixed throughout the experiment. 
(8) The exchange rate from experimental dollars to Chinese yuan is 22:1. 
(9) Do not discuss your decisions with other subjects. 
 
Are there any questions? 
41 
 
 
If all things are clear, please click “next” on your screen and finish those questions. Note that 
the purpose of those questions is only to make you understand the instructions and your 
answers will not affect your earnings in the experiment. 
 
Appendix 
Earning Tables:   
Total payoff = Private return + Individual return from the group account+28 
Private 
account 
(E − xi) 
Private return 
(E$) 
Group 
account (∑ x) 
Individual 
return from 
the group 
account (E$) 
Group 
account (∑ x) 
Individual 
return from 
the group 
account 
(E$) 
0 0 0 0 33 32.9 
1 1 1 1.4 34 33.4 
2 2 2 2.8 35 33.9 
3 3 3 4.2 36 34.4 
4 4 4 5.6 37 34.9 
5 5 5 6.9 38 35.3 
6 6 6 8.2 39 35.7 
7 7 7 9.5 40 36.1 
8 8 8 10.7 41 36.4 
 9 11.9 42 36.7 
10 13.1 43 37 
11 14.3 44 37.2 
12 15.4 45 37.4 
13 16.5 46 37.6 
14 17.6 47 37.8 
15 18.7 48 38 
16 19.7 49 38.1 
17 20.7 50 38.2 
18 21.6 51 38.3 
19 22.5 52 38.3 
20 23.4 53 38.3 
21 24.3 54 38.3 
22 25.2 55 38.2 
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23 26.1 56 38.1 
24 26.9 57 38 
25 27.7 58 37.9 
26 28.4 59 37.8 
27 29.1 60 37.6 
28 29.8 61 37.4 
29 30.5 62 37.2 
30 31.1 63 36.9 
31 31.7 64 36.6 
32 32.3   
 
Tables of two kinds of return 
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Explanation for the calculator 
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This part is a 
calculator to help 
you query the 
Earning Tables. 
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(The QL1P experiment) 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment concerning economic decision-making. At the end of today's 
session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain silent and do 
not watch at other people's decisions. Please shut down your cell phone and don’t talk with 
others. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand. If you 
exclaim out loudly or violate any of the rules explained below, you may be asked to leave and 
will not be paid. This is necessary for our experiment. 
We thank you very much for your cooperation in this regard. 
 
Overview 
 
You can enter any 
number of the 
tokens in your 
private account and 
group account here. 
When you press the 
button of “Calculate”, 
the results will appear 
here. 
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There will be 30 decision-making rounds in this experiment. You will each make a 
decision in each of these rounds. At the end of each round, you will be informed your earnings 
for that round on the PC screen. The rules are similar in every round.  
In the first round, you will be randomly assigned to a group. Each group consists of eight 
members. The composition of your group will be fixed throughout the experiment. You will 
not know which of the other people in the lab are in your group in any given round. You will 
be paid the total of your earnings of all rounds at the end of today's session. 
 
Rules 
 
In each round, you have eight tokens to allocate. You must decide the number of tokens 
to place into either or both of two accounts: a private account and a group account. All tokens 
must be placed in one account or the other. Each token you placed in the private account 
generates a return to you (and to you alone), and each token you placed in the group account 
generates a return to every member of your group. Returns from the two accounts are listed in 
the Earning Tables. Everybody has the exact identical Earning Tables. When the experiment 
begins, you need to enter your decisions in the blanks on the screen. Your entries on the blanks 
must be whole numbers between 0 and 8 and must be summed to be 8. 
After everyone has made a decision, the computer will compute the total number of 
tokens placed in the group account by your group in this round, and prepare a “Report to 
Subject” for each of you. You can record the number that the computer has reported on the line 
entitled "Total Number of Tokens Placed By Your Group in Your Group Account was" and 
compute your earnings. Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings from both 
the private account and the group account. To determine your earnings from the private 
account, you need to find the number from the column headed "Private Account(E − xi)” and 
“Private return (E$)” on the Earning Tables, according to your decision. To determine your 
earnings from the group account, you need to find the correct number in the column headed 
“Group account (∑ x)” and “Individual return from the group account (E$)” on the Earning 
Tables. This part reports the amount you will earn from the group account. Your total payoff 
will be reported on the PC screen corresponding to the number of tokens you have placed in 
your private account and your group has placed in the group account in that round.  
Next, you should check to see if your calculation is consistent with the computer’s report 
on the screen. It is extremely important that we both make this calculation and the results are 
consistent. If your calculation differs from the computer’s or if you are unsure on how to 
compute your earnings in any round, please raise your hand. When all things are correct, the 
next round will begin. 
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          Finally, at the end of experiment, the earnings you have gotten in today’s session will be 
exchanged for Chinese yuan at an exchange rate of 110:1. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
(1) All subjects have the same Earning Tables. 
(2) This session will last 30 rounds.  
(3) In each round, you and other members of your group will each have 8 tokens to allocate. 
(4) In each round, you need to decide the number of tokens to place in your private account 
and the number of tokens to place in your group account. You must distribute all 8 tokens in 
each round.  
(5) Your earnings from the private account depend only on your decision (the number of 
tokens that you placed in the account). 
(6) Your earnings from the group account depend upon the total number of tokens your group 
placed in this account.  
(7) The members in your group will be fixed in each round. 
(8) The exchange rate from experimental dollars to Chinese yuan is 110:1 
(9) Do not discuss your decisions with other subjects. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
If all things are clear, please click “next” on your screen and finish those questions. Note that 
the purpose of those questions is only to make you understand the instructions and your 
answers will not affect your earnings in the experiment. 
 
Appendix 
Earning Tables:   
Total payoff = Private return + Individual return from the group account 
Private Private return Group Individual Group Individual 
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account 
(E − xi) 
(E$) account (∑ x) return from 
the group 
account (E$) 
account 
(∑ x) 
return from 
the group 
account 
(E$) 
0 0 0 0 33 325 
1 10 1 15 34 330 
2 20 2 30 35 335 
3 30 3 45 36 340 
4 40 4 60 37 345 
5 50 5 75 38 350 
6 60 6 90 39 355 
7 70 7 105 40 360 
8 80 8 120 41 365 
 9 135 42 370 
10 150 43 375 
11 165 44 380 
12 180 45 385 
13 195 46 390 
14 210 47 395 
15 225 48 400 
16 240 49 401 
17 245 50 402 
18 250 51 403 
19 255 52 404 
20 260 53 405 
21 265 54 406 
22 270 55 407 
23 275 56 408 
24 280 57 409 
25 285 58 410 
26 290 59 411 
27 295 60 412 
28 300 61 413 
29 305 62 414 
30 310 63 415 
31 315 64 416 
32 320   
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Tables of two kinds of return 
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Explanation for the calculator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This part is a 
calculator to help 
you query the 
Earning Tables. 
 
You can enter any 
number of the 
tokens in your 
private account and 
group account here. 
 
When you press the 
button of “Calculate”, 
the results will appear 
here. 
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(The QL1M experiment) 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment concerning economic decision-making. At the end of today's 
session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain silent and do 
not watch at other people's decisions. Please shut down your cell phone and don’t talk with 
others. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand. If you 
exclaim out loudly or violate any of the rules explained below, you may be asked to leave and 
will not be paid. This is necessary for our experiment. 
We thank you very much for your cooperation in this regard. 
 
Overview 
 
There will be 30 decision-making rounds in this experiment. You will each make a 
decision in each of these rounds. At the end of each round, you will be informed your earnings 
for that round on the PC screen. The rules are similar in every round.  
In the first round, you will be randomly assigned to a group. Each group consists of eight 
members. The composition of your group will be fixed throughout the experiment. You will 
not know which of the other people in the lab are in your group in any given round. You will 
be paid the total of your earnings for all rounds at the end of today's session. 
 
Rules 
 
In each round, you have eight tokens to allocate. You must decide the number of tokens 
to place into either or both of two accounts: a private account and a group account. All tokens 
must be placed in one account or the other. Your earnings are listed in the Earning Table. 
Everybody has the exact same Earning Tables. When the experiment begins, you need to enter 
your decisions in the blanks on the screen. Your entries on the blanks must be whole numbers 
between 0 and 8 and must be summed to be 8. 
After everyone has made a decision, the computer will compute the total number of 
tokens placed in the group account by the other members in your group in this round, and 
prepare a “Report to Subject” for each of you. You can record the number that the computer 
51 
 
has reported on the line entitled "Total Number of Tokens Placed By the Other Members of 
Your Group in Your Group Account was" and compute your earnings. In each round, your 
earnings depend on the tokens placed by your own and the total tokens placed by the other 
seven group members into the group account. In the Earning Table, you can find the column 
corresponding to the number of tokens placed to the group account by you own and the line 
corresponding to the total number of tokens placed to the group account by the other seven 
group members. The number at the intersection of the line and the column is your earning in 
that round. Your earnings will be reported on the PC screen corresponding to the tokens you 
have placed in the group account and the total tokens that the other seven members of your 
group have placed in the group account in that round.  
Next, you should check to see if your calculation is consistent with the computer’s report 
on the screen. It is extremely important that we both make this calculation and the results are 
consistent. If your calculation differs from the computer’s or if you are unsure on how to 
compute your earnings in any round, please raise your hand. When all things are correct, the 
next round will begin. 
          Finally, at the end of experiment, the earnings you have gotten in today’s session will be 
exchanged for Chinese yuan at an exchange rate of 110:1. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
(1) All subjects have the same Earning Table. 
(2) This session will last 30 rounds.  
(3) In each round, you and other members of your group will each have 8 tokens to distribute. 
(4) In each round, you need to decide the number of tokens to place in your private account 
and the number of tokens to place in your group account. You must allocate all 8 tokens in 
each round.  
(5) Your earnings depend on the tokens that you have placed in the group account and the 
total tokens that the other seven members of your group have placed in the group account. 
(6) The members in your group will be fixed in each round. 
(7) The exchange rate from experimental dollars to Chinese yuan is 110:1 
(8) Do not discuss your decisions with other subjects. 
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Are there any questions? 
 
If all things are clear, please click “next” on your screen and finish those questions. Note that 
the purpose of those questions is only to make you understand the instructions and your 
answers will not affect your earnings in the experiment. 
 
Appendix 
Earning Table:   
The tokens that you have  
placed in the group  
account  
The total tokens that the  
other seven members of  
your group has placed  
in the group account. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 
1 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 
2 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 
3 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
4 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 
5 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 
6 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 
7 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 225 
8 200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240 
9 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 245 
10 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 255 250 
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11 245 250 255 260 265 270 265 260 255 
12 260 265 270 275 280 275 270 265 260 
13 275 280 285 290 285 280 275 270 265 
14 290 295 300 295 290 285 280 275 270 
15 305 310 305 300 295 290 285 280 275 
16 320 315 310 305 300 295 290 285 280 
17 325 320 315 310 305 300 295 290 285 
18 330 325 320 315 310 305 300 295 290 
19 335 330 325 320 315 310 305 300 295 
20 340 335 330 325 320 315 310 305 300 
21 345 340 335 330 325 320 315 310 305 
22 350 345 340 335 330 325 320 315 310 
23 355 350 345 340 335 330 325 320 315 
24 360 355 350 345 340 335 330 325 320 
25 365 360 355 350 345 340 335 330 325 
26 370 365 360 355 350 345 340 335 330 
27 375 370 365 360 355 350 345 340 335 
28 380 375 370 365 360 355 350 345 340 
29 385 380 375 370 365 360 355 350 345 
30 390 385 380 375 370 365 360 355 350 
31 395 390 385 380 375 370 365 360 355 
32 400 395 390 385 380 375 370 365 360 
33 405 400 395 390 385 380 375 370 365 
34 410 405 400 395 390 385 380 375 370 
35 415 410 405 400 395 390 385 380 375 
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36 420 415 410 405 400 395 390 385 380 
37 425 420 415 410 405 400 395 390 385 
38 430 425 420 415 410 405 400 395 390 
39 435 430 425 420 415 410 405 400 395 
40 440 435 430 425 420 415 410 405 400 
41 445 440 435 430 425 420 415 410 401 
42 450 445 440 435 430 425 420 411 402 
43 455 450 445 440 435 430 421 412 403 
44 460 455 450 445 440 431 422 413 404 
45 465 460 455 450 441 432 423 414 405 
46 470 465 460 451 442 433 424 415 406 
47 475 470 461 452 443 434 425 416 407 
48 480 471 462 453 444 435 426 417 408 
49 481 472 463 454 445 436 427 418 409 
50 482 473 464 455 446 437 428 419 410 
51 483 474 465 456 447 438 429 420 411 
52 484 475 466 457 448 439 430 421 412 
53 485 476 467 458 449 440 431 422 413 
54 486 477 468 459 450 441 432 423 414 
55 487 478 469 460 451 442 433 424 415 
56 488 479 470 461 452 443 434 425 416 
 
Explanation for the calculator 
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This part is a 
calculator to help 
you query the 
Earning Table. 
 
You can enter the 
numbers of any 
allocation here. 
When you press the 
button of “Calculate”, 
the results will appear 
here. 
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(The QL2N experiment) 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment concerning economic decision-making. At the end of today's 
session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain silent and do 
not watch at other people's decisions. Please shut down your cell phone and don’t talk with 
others. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand. If you 
exclaim out loudly or violate any of the rules explained below, you may be asked to leave and 
will not be paid. This is necessary for our experiment. 
We thank you very much for your cooperation in this regard. 
 
Overview 
 
There will be at least 15 decision-making rounds in this experiment. You will each make 
a decision in each of these rounds. When the first 15 rounds are finished, the experiment will 
continue with a probability of 30%. In other words, the experiment will be directly terminated 
with a probability of 70%. At the end of each round, you will be informed your earnings for 
that round on the PC screen. The rules are similar in every round.  
In the first round, you will be randomly assigned to a group. Each group consists of eight 
members. The composition of your group will be fixed throughout the experiment. You will 
not know which of the other people in the lab are in your group in any given round. You will 
be paid the total of your earnings for all rounds at the end of today's session. 
 
Rules 
 
In each round, you have eight tokens to allocate. You must decide the number of tokens 
to place into either or both of two accounts: a private account and a group account. All tokens 
must be placed in one account or the other. Each token you placed in the private account 
generates a return to you (and to you alone), and each token you placed in the group account 
generates a return to every member of your group. Returns from the two accounts are listed in 
the 'Earning Tables'. Everybody has the same Earning Tables. When the experiment begins, 
you need to enter your decisions in the blanks on the screen. Your entries on the blanks must 
be whole numbers between 0 and 8 and must be summed to be 8. 
57 
 
After everyone has made a decision, the computer will compute the total number of 
tokens placed in the group account by your group in this round, and prepare a “Report to 
Subject” for each of you. You can record the number that the computer has reported on the line 
entitled "Total Number of Tokens Placed By Your Group in Your Group Account was" and 
compute your earnings. Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings from both 
the private account and the group account. To determine your earnings from the private 
account, you need to find the number from the column headed "Private Account(E − xi)” and 
“Private return (E$)” on the Earning Tables according to your decisions. To determine your 
earnings from the group account, you need to find the correct number in the column headed 
“Group account (∑ x)” and “Individual return from the group account (E$)” on the Earning 
Tables. This part reports the amount you will earn from the group account. Your total payoff 
will be reported on the PC screen corresponding to the number of tokens you have placed in 
your private account and your group has placed in the group account in that round.  
Next, you should check to see if your calculation is consistent with the computer’s report 
on the screen. It is extremely important that we both make this calculation and the results are 
consistent. If your calculation differs from the computer’s or if you are unsure on how to 
compute your earnings in any round, please raise your hand. When all things are correct, the 
next round will begin. 
          Finally, at the end of experiment, the earnings you have gotten in today’s session will be 
exchanged for Chinese yuan at an exchange rate of 22:1. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
(1) All subjects have the same Earning Tables. 
(2) This session will consist of at least 15 rounds. From 16th round, the experiment will continue 
with a probability of 30%. 
(3) In each round, you and other members of your group will each have 8 tokens to distribute. 
(4) In each round, you need to decide the number of tokens to place in your private account 
and the number of tokens to place in your group account. You must allocate all 8 tokens in 
each round.  
(5) Your earnings from the private account depend only on your decision (the number of 
tokens that you placed in the account). 
(6) Your earnings from the group account depend upon the total number of tokens your group 
placed in this account.  
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(7) The members in your group will be fixed in each round. 
(8) The exchange rate from experimental dollars to Chinese yuan is 22:1 
(9) Do not discuss your decisions with other subjects. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
If all things are clear, please click “next” on your screen and finish those questions. Note that 
the purpose of those questions is only to make you understand the instructions and your 
answers will not affect your earnings in the experiment. 
 
Appendix 
Earning Tables:   
 
Total payoff = Private return + Individual return from the group account 
Private 
account 
(E − xi) 
Private return 
(E$) 
Group 
account (∑ x) 
Individual 
return from 
the group 
account (E$) 
Group 
account 
(∑ x) 
Individual 
return from 
the group 
account 
(E$) 
0 0 0 0 33 33 
1 10.6 1 1 34 34 
2 19.5 2 2 35 35 
3 26.6 3 3 36 36 
4 32 4 4 37 37 
5 35.6 5 5 38 38 
6 37.5 6 6 39 39 
7 37.6 7 7 40 40 
8 36 8 8 41 41 
 9 9 42 42 
10 10 43 43 
11 11 44 44 
12 12 45 45 
13 13 46 46 
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14 14 47 47 
15 15 48 48 
16 16 49 49 
17 17 50 50 
18 18 51 51 
19 19 52 52 
20 20 53 53 
21 21 54 54 
22 22 55 55 
23 23 56 56 
24 24 57 57 
25 25 58 58 
26 26 59 59 
27 27 60 60 
28 28 61 61 
29 29 62 62 
30 30 63 63 
31 31 64 64 
32 32   
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This part is a 
calculator to help 
you query the 
Earning Tables. 
You can enter any 
number of the 
tokens in your 
private account and 
group account here. 
When you press the 
button of “Calculate”, 
the results will appear 
here. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Belief formation, Response, and Convergence in the 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with Heterogeneous 
Quasi-Linear Payoff Functions 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In many situations, the equilibrium analysis plays a central role in economic studies. Most of 
these studies take an implicit assumption that the dynamic system they concerned eventually 
converges to the equilibrium benchmark used in the studies. However, if a dynamic system is 
not locally or globally stable at the equilibrium, only a static equilibrium analysis is not 
sufficed. For a long time, the empirical investigations regarding stability properties of the Nash 
equilibrium have attracted a lot of attention in the field of oligopoly competition (i.e. Cox and 
Walker 1998; Rassenti et al. 2000; Huck et al. 2002). By contrast, most of the experimental 
studies on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) ignore this problem because they 
employ a design of linear environments in which there always exists a dominant equilibrium. 
This might fail to capture the problem of different stability properties of the Nash equilibrium 
in the real-world VCM scenarios (Saijo 2014; Feng et al. 2018).          
         In this study, we are interested in the quasi-linear VCM environment. In most practical 
cases of providing public goods using the VCM, the private good is money. Hence, the 
marginal return of the private good could be assumed to be a constant. However, the marginal 
return of a specific public good usually decreases as the level of the public good increases. 
Therefore, a quasi-linear VCM environment could be used to model these scenarios. In a 
homogeneous setting of this environment, there are multiple locally unstable Nash equilibria 
(Saijo 2014). Feng et al. (2018) have further empirically demonstrated the non-convergence of 
individual contributions although there still exists a distance between experimental 
observations and the instability argument of Saijo (2014). As an extension of their study, the 
current study devotes to investigating the heterogeneous setting of the quasi-linear VCM 
environment because participators usually benefit in different ways from the public good in 
the real-world scenarios. After including benefit heterogeneity in this environment, a unique 
static Nash equilibrium exists in the game (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Saijo 2015). Furthermore, 
based on the assumption of Cournot best-response dynamics in which players simultaneously 
make a self-interested best response to their last observations of their opponents’ actions, Saijo 
(2015) shows a necessary and sufficient condition for global stability at the unique Nash 
equilibrium in this asymmetric environment.  
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        This theoretical result implies that different heterogeneous settings induce different 
stability properties for the unique Nash equilibrium and, thus, the contribution behavior might 
also differ among these settings in the quasi-linear VCM experiments. However, previous 
studies focus only on comparing experimental observations between treatments with a 
heterogeneous design and those with a homogeneous design (for linear VCM environments, 
see Ledyard (1995); for nonlinear VCM environments, see Chan et al. (1999, 2012); McGinty 
and Milam (2013)). In other words, in order to better understand the effects of heterogeneous 
benefits, the theoretical results of Saijo (2015) deserve further experimental investigation. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that aims to provide experimental 
comparisons of contributions across different heterogeneous designs in a quasi-linear VCM 
environment.  
        On the basis of previous experimental observations, although the Cournot best-response 
dynamic is useful in theoretical analyses, its assumptions of the myopic belief formation 
process and the self-interested best response process are usually too strict to explain 
experimental observations in the VCM experiments. The challenges come from empirical 
evidence of both the belief formation process and the response process. 
        Regarding the belief formation process, Healy (2006) provides a theoretical discussion and 
experimental evidence based on a k-period average learning model, which assumes players 
form their beliefs in the current period from their observations of the previous k periods, in a 
quasi-linear VCM environment with a heterogeneous design. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
further provide experimental evidence showing that belief formation in a linear VCM 
environment can be regarded as a weighted average of the belief and the observation of the 
previous period.  
        Regarding the response process, many studies on VCM experiments suggest that most 
players are conditional cooperators who always want to match the (average) contributions of 
others (Chaudhuri 2011). Several different motivations of conditional cooperation are well 
documented in the literature. For example, it can be explained by theoretical models with 
assumptions of inequity aversion and/or reciprocity. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a 
survey of these other-regarding utility models. In particular, in the linear VCM environment, 
the observed conditional cooperation is closely related to the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) (Goeree et al. 2002; Ledyard 1995). This is because different MPCRs of a VCM 
environment induce different opportunity costs among choices. A high MPCR has a strong 
positive impact on conditional cooperation because the opportunity cost of matching beliefs is 
relatively low.  
 However, in the quasi-linear VCM environment, the previous study, Healy (2006), finds 
that players seem to make the best response to the average of observations in previous up to 
seven periods. In addition, in the neighbor field of common-pool resources, Saijo et al. (2017) 
empirically show that subjects are relatively myopic and very close to the best-response 
behavior using the experimental data from Walker et al. (1990). Therefore, the current study 
still takes the predictions of the Cournot best-response dynamics from Saijo (2015) as a 
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theoretical benchmark. We intend to empirically investigate decision processes employed 
by subjects in a lab experiment and to show the distance between experimental 
observations and theoretical predictions. 
        Our analysis investigates the belief formation process, the response process, and their 
effects on convergence. To this end, for simplicity, we choose a three-player group setting, 
with two levels of benefits from the public good. Four treatments with different heterogeneous 
settings are designed to share an identical Nash equilibrium, but with different stability 
properties. Two treatments in our design are globally stable, while the other two are non-
globally stable, following the theoretical prediction of Saijo (2015).22 Moreover, in contrast to 
previous studies, we investigate the decision-making processes of players by eliciting their 
beliefs about individual contributions of the other group members, rather than about the 
average contributions of others, in the experiment. Therefore, the overall decision-making 
process in the experiment is divided into two parts: a belief-formation process and a response 
process. 
        Our data show significant differences in the belief-formation processes, the response 
processes, and the convergence of subjects’ contribution behavior across the four treatments. 
The Nash equilibrium is a good predictor for the two globally stable treatments, but not for the 
two non-globally stable treatments. However, even though the convergence of contributions 
differs among the four treatments, the groups’ total contributions are not significantly different 
in the last 10 periods of the experiments. Furthermore, in order to determine why the 
convergence in each of the four treatments differs, we use a simulation to compare the 
outcomes under several different counterfactual assumptions. Our main result is that the 
theoretical predictions are well supported by the experimental evidence in the two globally 
stable treatments, but that the non-convergence in the two non-globally stable treatments 
stems from changes in the decision-making processes of subjects, rather than from the non-
global stability of the Cournot best-response dynamics.  
       The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the 
environment and the theoretical results of Saijo (2015). Section 3.3 presents our experimental 
design and procedure, and then we report our findings in section 3.4. In section 3.5, we 
conduct a simulation using a 2 × 2 design to investigate the isolated effect on the convergence 
of the belief-formation process and the response process. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
3.2 Environment and Theoretical Results 
Consider a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) environment. There are n players. For 
the set of players 𝛪 = {1, … , 𝑛}, each i has differentiable quasi-linear payoff functions from 
consuming private goods 𝑥𝑖 and the single public good 𝑆, which is the sum of all players’ 
                                                          
22 In this study, we say a dynamic system is non-globally stable at an equilibrium unless the 
dynamic sequences starting from all initial points in the feasible strategy space converge to the 
equilibrium. We provide a formal definition of the global stability in Section 3.2.     
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contributions (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛). That is 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑆) = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖(𝑆), where 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and 𝑡𝑖(𝑆) is increasing 
and strictly concave in 𝑆. Let 𝐸𝑖 denote the endowment of player i. Then, player i faces the 
following maximization problem: 
 
        𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑖  𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑠−𝑖),                                                                                                            (3.1) 
 
 subject to 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖, where 𝑠−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . In such a maximization problem, it is well known 
that the best response function is as follows: 
  
       𝑠𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑀𝑎𝑥{− ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 , 0}, 𝐸𝑖},                                                                                    (3.2)                                 
 
where 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖
′−1(1), which is the intercept (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Saijo 2015). Let 𝜋𝑖(𝐸𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 +
𝑠−𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠−𝑖). In such an environment, a list of individual contributions ?̂? = (?̂?1, ?̂?2, ⋯ , ?̂?𝑛) is a 
Nash equilibrium if, for all i, 𝑣𝑖(?̂?𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) ≥ 𝑣𝑖(𝑠𝑖, ?̂?−𝑖) for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0,  𝐸𝑖], where ?̂?−𝑖 = ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . For 
simplicity, let 𝑎1 denote the intercept of the player with the largest intercept, and 𝑎j be the 
intercept of the best-response curve of player j. Then, the following proposition from Saijo 
(2015) shows the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that 𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑗 ≥ 0 for all j ≠ 1, and 𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑎𝑖 for all i. Then the unique 
Nash equilibrium is (𝑎1, 0, …, 0).  
 
Proposition 3.1 states that, in equilibrium, the player with the largest intercept contributes an 
amount equal to his/her own intercept, while all other group members contribute nothing. 
Before we discuss the stability property of this unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary to 
define several concepts with regard to the stability property. In this study, the stability 
property of an equilibrium refers only to the asymptotical stability of the Cournot best-
response dynamics. The Cournot best-response dynamics indicate that the best-response 
function of equation (3.2) becomes  
 
      𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑀𝑎𝑥{− ∑ 𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 , 0}, 𝐸𝑖},                                                                            (3.3) 
 
 where 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 indicates the contribution of player i at period t. An intuitive interpretation of the 
asymptotical stability is that if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, all nearby solutions not 
only stay nearby but also tend to the equilibrium (see, Hirsch and Smale 1974). Hence, we refer 
to this stability property as the Cournot stability, where a system is globally stable if and only 
if the sequences starting from every possible initial point in the dynamic system converge to 
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some equilibrium with Cournot best-response dynamics.23 Formally, we employ the following 
definition of global stability. 
 
Definition 3.1. Let 𝑂 = ∏ [0, 𝐸𝑖]𝑖∈𝐼  denote the feasible strategy space of system (3.3). The system 
is globally asymptotically stable at an equilibrium ?̂?, if and only if, for any 𝑠𝑡 = (𝑠1,𝑡, … , 𝑠𝑛,𝑡) ∈
𝑂, 𝑠𝑡 converges to ?̂? as 𝑡 approaches infinity.           
         
        Since Proposition 3.1 shows that the Nash equilibrium is unique, global stability indicates 
that sequences starting from every feasible initial point converge to the unique Nash 
equilibrium. Based on the assumption of Cournot best-response dynamics, the following 
proposition from Saijo (2015) shows the necessary and sufficient condition for the global 
stability of the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that 𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑗 ≥ 0 for all j ≠ 1, and 𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑎𝑖 for all i. Then, the system is 
globally stable at the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if 𝑎1 > ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=2 . 
 
Proposition 3.2 indicates that if the largest intercept is sufficiently large (larger than the sum of 
the other intercepts), then the system is globally stable at the unique Nash equilibrium; 
otherwise, it is non-globally stable at the unique Nash equilibrium. The non-global stability 
indicates that sequences starting from some initial points will not converge to Nash 
equilibrium and will be pulsing between some particular points after a few periods. This 
implies that contributions might become unstable (repeatedly alternate between some 
numbers). For details, see discussions in the next section.  
        Based on these two propositions of Saijo (2015), we design four treatments with an 
identical Nash equilibrium, but with different stability properties. For each of global stability 
and non-global stability, we design two treatments to serve as a robustness check for the 
experimental observations. In the next section, we explain our experimental design and 
procedure. 
 
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiments were conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Lab at 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) in March 2016. We designed four treatments of three-
player repeated public goods games. Each treatment consists of four sessions. In each session, 
                                                          
23 Here, “all possible initial points” means all possible combinations of the initial play of every 
player. 
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there are 21 or 24 voluntary subjects. Subjects were recruited from among the SJTU students 
via an Internet recruiting system. The experiment was run on a local area network using a 
program called z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).        
        At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are assigned randomly to a three-person 
group (𝑛 = 3). The composition of the groups remains the same throughout the session. Then, 
each player in a group is randomly assigned an investor number (1, 2, or 3). These investor 
numbers also remain fixed for subjects throughout the session.  In each session, the public 
goods game is repeated for 25 periods. 
At the beginning of each period, every player receives an endowment of 12 tokens and 
then decides on the number of tokens that he/she intends to contribute to a common project. 
The feasible choice set is 𝑠𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … ,12}. Contributing to the common project generates a 
payoff to every player in the group, given by the following payoff function: 
 
        𝜋𝑖 = 10[12 − 𝑠𝑖 + (𝑎𝑖 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑆 + 1)] ;  𝑖 = 1, 2, or 3,                                                           (3.4) 
 
where 𝑠𝑖 denotes the individual contribution of player i, S is the group’s total contribution, and 
𝑎𝑖 is a positive constant.24 In this formula, 10(12 − 𝑠𝑖) denotes the income from the remained 
tokens and 10[(𝑎𝑖 + 1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑆 + 1)] denotes the income from the common project. In each group, 
the three players are divided into two different experimental roles, each with different 𝑎𝑖. The 
player with investor number = 1 obtains an outstanding benefit from the public good, while 
the other two players obtain a relatively lower, but identical benefit from the public good. 
Hence, in our experiment, we assume 𝑎1 > 𝑎2 = 𝑎3. In each session, there are two different 
payoff tables, both of which are given to every subject.25        
        Table 3.1 shows the parameters and theoretical predictions for our experiments. For all 
treatments, the unique Nash equilibrium is (10, 0, 0). This theoretical result indicates that, in 
Nash equilibrium, the player with investor number = 1 contributes 10 tokens, while the other 
two players contribute nothing. Furthermore, the system is globally stable at the unique Nash 
equilibrium in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4). However, in the other two treatments, the 
system is non-globally stable.  
  
Table 3.1  Parameters and theoretical predictions 
Treatments (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3)              (10,2,2)                (10,4,4)                 (10,6,6)                (10,8,8) 
                                                          
24 Note that, 𝑎𝑖 is the intercept of player i’s (self-interested) best-response curve for this payoff 
function. 
25 See Section 1 in the supplementary documents for the instructions and payoff tables translated 
from Chinese. In the experiment, we also design a calculator to help subjects quickly compare the 
possible outcomes. 
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Endowment                                     12                          12                          12                          12 
Unique Nash  
equilibrium (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, 𝑠3
∗)               (10,0,0)                (10,0,0)                  (10,0,0)                (10,0,0) 
Cournot stability                         globally                globally             non-globally         non-globally 
Optimal social outcome  
(group’s total contribution)         16                          20                          24                         28      
Average MPCR                              6.43                       7.95                       9.46                     10.98 
Sessions                                            4                            4                            4                            4 
Groups/subjects                          30/90                   31/93                    32/96                    31/93 
Total period                                    25                          25                          25                          25 
 
       Because the theory predicts that the sequences starting from some initial points will not 
converge to the Nash equilibrium but from some other points will converge in such non-
globally stable situations, we conducted simulations to check the convergence of sequences 
starting from every possible initial point in the two non-globally stable treatments. The 
simulations show that sequences starting from 526 and 136 of 2197 (133) possible initial points 
converge to the unique Nash equilibrium with Cournot best-response dynamics in treatments 
(10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8), respectively. Figure 3.1 shows the positions of these stable initial points 
in a three-dimensional graph, where “Player i” denotes the initial contribution of the player 
with investor number i = 1, 2, or 3. The shapes of the stable regions in treatments (10, 6, 6) and 
(10, 8, 8) are irregular. Some initial points (e.g., (0, 0, 12)), are relatively far away from the Nash 
equilibrium but are still stable. Sequences starting from the unstable region pulse after several 
periods between (0, 0, 0) and (10, 6, 6) or between (2, 0, 0) and (10, 4, 4) in treatment (10, 6, 6), 
and between (0, 0, 0) and (10, 8, 8) or between (6, 0, 0) and (10, 2, 2) in treatment (10, 8, 8). 
 
  
                                                    
                   Panel A: Treatment (10,6,6)                                    Panel B: Treatment (10,8,8) 
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Fig. 3.1 Stable initial points (blue) versus unstable initial points (red) in treatments (10,6,6) and (10,8,8) 
 
       The optimal social outcomes are calculated with the Samuelson condition.26 In our design, 
although the marginal per capita return (MPCR) varies with the group’s total contribution, we 
still have a general ranking for the average MPCR of the two experimental roles across the four 
treatments.27 The average MPCR reported in Table 3.1 is increased continuously from 
treatment (10, 2, 2) to treatment (10, 8, 8). Note that, the MPCR of low benefit players (investors 
2 and 3) are different across treatments but, for those high benefit players (investor 1), it is 
identical. Thus, our experimental design also serves as an investigation of the behavioral 
changes of investor 1, when the external MPCR (the MPCR of other players) varies.                                                                   
       In addition to the choices of contributions, we also elicited each subject’s beliefs about the 
individual contributions of the other two group members.28 This is incentivized. We follow the 
design in Gächter and Renner (2010) and set the payoff function 𝑦𝑖𝑗 for the belief elicitation 
task as follows29: 
                                                          
26 The Samuelson condition refers to a condition for the efficient provision of public goods 
(Samuelson 1954). In our experiment, the Samuelson condition requires that the social optimum of 
the group’s total contribution be equal to 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 + 𝑎3 + 2. 
27 The MPCR refers to the individual benefit of the public good from one additional contribution to 
the public good. In our experiment, it is 10[
𝑎𝑖+1
𝑆+1
]. Because the payoff function is quasi-linear, the 
MPCR varies with the group’s total contribution, 𝑆. Therefore, we calculate the average of all 
possible MPCR of the three players for the comparisons across treatments, which is 
1
111
∑ ∑ 10[
𝑎𝑖+1
𝑆+1
]36𝑠=0
3
𝑖=1 . 
28 Since each group consists of three players, each player should make two predictions in each 
period. The payoffs from the two predictions are calculated separately and then summed in each 
period.  
29 Note that, in this payoff design, the penalty increases when the distance from being correct 
becomes small, which is different from other designs (i.e. quadratic scoring rule). The main 
justification is that we intend to give higher incentive to making an exactly correct prediction. 
Nash Nash 
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     𝑦𝑖𝑗 = {
150, 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗   
100
|𝐵𝑖𝑗−𝑠𝑗|
, 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑠𝑗
;   𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑜𝑟 3, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,                                                                      (3.5) 
 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑗 is player i’s stated belief about player j’s contribution, and 𝑠𝑗 is the observed 
contribution of player j. This payoff function indicates that, if player i’s prediction is exactly 
equal to player j’s choice, player i can get 150 experimental dollars, otherwise, the prediction 
payoff is equal to 100 divided by the absolute difference between player i’s prediction and 
player j’s choice.  
         In the payment procedure, following Blanco et al. (2010), we employ a special design to 
eliminate the hedging problem.30 At the end of the experiment, the real payments of all 
subjects in each session depend on either the total payoff from the contribution task or the total 
payoff from the prediction task, based on a random mechanism. Therefore, the scale of the 
payoffs in equation (3.5) is designed to be comparable to the income from the VCM. Blanco et 
al. (2010) set an equal probability (1/2 versus 1/2) for the payoff from each of the two tasks. 
Differing slightly from their design, we set different probabilities for the payoff from each of 
the two tasks. For all treatments, the real payments of players depend on the total payoff from 
the contribution task, with probability 5/6, or on the total payoff from the prediction task, with 
probability 1/6.  
        We also conducted two additional sessions with the settings of treatment (10, 8, 8) but 
using equal probabilities (1/2 versus 1/2) (see Section 2 of the supplementary documents for 
the report on these two additional sessions). The results show that the contributions from 
investors 2 and 3 are significantly higher in the experiment with the equal probability design 
than in the experiment with the different probability design. Therefore, we suggest that, in 
addition to the hedging problem, a high-incentivized design of belief elicitation still induces a 
significant change in contributions, compared to a low-incentivized design. Because we intend 
to make the influence stemming from the belief elicitation as small as possible (but not 
completely remove the incentivized design), we employ the design which assigns a high 
probability to the payoff of the contribution task and a low probability to the payoff of the 
prediction task.  
At the end of each period, each player receives feedback on the experimental results 
in that period. This includes his/her own payoffs from contribution and prediction tasks, 
and the individual contributions and investor numbers of group members. However, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Because the choices and predictions are the whole numbers in a continuous interval, [0, 12], players 
might choose a middle number to hedge between several different predictions. This payoff design 
eliminates these hedging motives.   
30 The hedging problem in the experiments with belief elicitation refers to the fact that a risk-averse 
subject might act according to an optimistic belief, but report a pessimistic belief in order to hedge 
against the possible loss from the action. For details, see Blanco et al. (2010). 
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excludes the individual predictions of the other group members. Therefore, the experimental 
design is complete information for the VCM. Every player knows the payoff structure of each 
player, as well as the individual contribution and investor number of each group member. 
However, although the design provides complete information, subjects cannot link an 
experimental role to a real person, because they make decisions in a closed chamber and are 
not allowed to communicate with other subjects.    
        Subjects receive instructions at the beginning of each session when entering the lab. A 
native speaking research assistant reads the instructions loudly. Then, all subjects are required 
to answer control questions correctly. At the end of each session, each subject receives his/her 
payment privately at a pre-announced exchange rate of 130 experimental dollars to 1 Chinese 
RMB. The 372 subjects earned RMB 60 (8.8 US dollars) each, on average, including a 
participation fee, with a range of RMB 45-RMB 75. Each session lasts about one hour and a half, 
including providing the instructions and making the necessary payments. 
 
3.4 Results 
In this section, we discuss the experimental data from three aspects. In the first subsection, we 
provide observations with regard to the convergence of the contribution behavior. The second 
subsection analyzes the belief-formation process. Then, we investigate the response process in 
the third subsection. 
 
3.4.1 Contributions and Nash Equilibrium Benchmark 
 
Result 3.1: (Contributions and Nash Equilibrium) Individual contributions in the final 10 
periods are much closer to the Nash equilibrium in the two globally stable treatments than in 
the two non-globally stable treatments, for both roles of players. However, no significant 
differences are observed in the groups’ total contributions across the four treatments in the 
final 10 periods. 
 
Support: In each group, subjects play two roles, each with different payoff structures. Thus, the 
average contributions are calculated separately. Figure 3.2 shows the average contributions 
over time for the two roles in the four treatments. Panel A displays the average contributions 
of players with investor number = 1. Here, the average contributions from the two globally 
stable treatments are much closer to the Nash prediction than those from the two non-globally 
stable treatments are. Panel B of Figure 2 displays the average contributions for players with 
investor number = 2 or 3. The graph clearly shows a reverse ordering of average contributions 
for the four treatments. Moreover, for both roles, the Kruskal–Wallis test shows a significant 
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difference among the four treatments in the final 10 periods (d.f. = 3, p-values < 0.001).31 The p-
values of Dunn’s tests are presented in Table 3.2 in order to compare the individual 
contributions in the final 10 periods across the four treatments. Overall, the average 
contribution from treatment (10, 2, 2) is closest to the Nash prediction in the final 10 periods 
among the averages of the four treatments. 
 
 
Panel A: Players with investor number =1
 
Panel B: players with investor number = 2 or 3 
                                                          
31 For all Kruskal–Wallis tests in this paper, we first calculate the average over periods for each 
individual in order to eliminate autocorrelation among periods. Then, we conduct the Kruskal–
Wallis test over the samples of averages. Moreover, because there are four treatments in our 
experiment, we use Dunn’s test with the Bonferroni correction to conduct pairwise comparisons 
when the null hypothesis in the Kruskal–Wallis test is rejected (Dunn 1964). 
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Fig. 3.2 The average contribution per period for two roles of subjects 
          
Table 3.2 Pairwise comparisons for contributions in the final 10 periods (Dunn’s test with the 
Bonferroni correction) 
Players with investor number = 1 
Treatments                              (10,2,2)                                 (10,4,4)                               (10,6,6)           
   (10,4,4)                                  0.5262                     
   (10,6,6)                                  0.0066                                   0.2623 
   (10,8,8)                                  0.0000                                   0.0010                                 0.1735 
Players with investor number = 2 or 3 
Treatments                              (10,2,2)                                 (10,4,4)                               (10,6,6)          
    (10,4,4)                                  0.0426                     
    (10,6,6)                                  0.0000                                   0.0325 
    (10,8,8)                                  0.0000                                   0.0000                                0.0097 
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Panel A: Players with investor number =1 
 
Panel B: players with investor number = 2 or 3
 
Fig. 3.3 The proportion of the Nash play in each period 
 
        To see the convergence of individual contributions, Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of 
players who played their part of the unique Nash equilibrium in each period. Each line depicts 
a treatment in each graph. Panel A shows that, in the final periods, the proportions almost 
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reach the 50 percent level in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4), but in treatments (10, 6, 6) and 
(10, 8, 8), they remain at a relatively low level. In Panel B, despite the fact that there is an 
ascending tendency shared by all treatments, the proportions are relatively lower in treatments 
(10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8) than those in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4). At the group level, there 
are 11 groups in treatment (10, 2, 2), seven groups in treatment (10, 4, 4), one group in 
treatment (10, 6, 6), and one group in treatment (10, 8, 8) in which contributions converge to 
the unique Nash equilibrium, (10, 0, 0), when the experiment progresses to the last five periods. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 The average of group total contributions per period 
 
Figure 3.4 reports the averages of the groups’ total contributions at each period, for all 
treatments. The Kruskal–Wallis test shows that, in the first 10 periods, the groups’ total 
contributions from the four treatments are significantly different (d.f. = 3, p-value = 0.0001). 
Dunn’s test further shows that the groups’ total contributions from treatment (10, 8, 8) are 
significantly higher than those from the other three treatments (p-values < 0.001 for the 
comparison with treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4), and p-value = 0.0387 for the comparison 
with treatment (10, 6, 6)). In addition, the groups’ total contributions from treatment (10, 6, 6) 
are higher than those from treatments (10, 2, 2) (p-value = 0.0130) and (10, 4, 4) (p-value = 
0.0906), but there is no significant difference between treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4) (p-
value = 1.0). However, in the final 10 periods, there is no longer a significant difference in the 
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groups’ total contributions across the four treatments (p-value = 0.459 by the Kruskal–
Wallis test).  
In summary, we observe a clear trend that indicates convergence to a unique Nash 
equilibrium in the two globally stable treatments. In contrast, the individual contributions 
are still far from the Nash prediction in the final 10 periods in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 
8, 8). These results seem consistent with the theoretical prediction of Saijo (2015). However, 
we find that sample autocorrelations of groups’ total contributions are positive for most 
groups in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8).32 The Kruskal–Wallis test further shows a 
slight difference over the sample autocorrelations across the four treatments (d.f. = 3, p-
value = 0.0520), but Dunn’s test shows that the only significant difference is between 
treatment (10, 2, 2) and treatment (10, 8, 8). The sample autocorrelations in treatment (10, 8, 
8) are significantly larger than those in treatment (10, 2, 2) (p-value = 0.0241). These results 
are inconsistent with the theoretical prediction that the Cournot best-response dynamics 
will induce pulsing contributions in some groups for treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8).33 
Therefore, to examine the reasons behind the differences in convergence, we release the 
assumption of Cournot best-response dynamics, and empirically investigate players’ 
belief-formation processes and response processes respectively in the following two 
subsections.  
 
3.4.2 Belief Formation Process  
First, we report the belief accuracy in the four treatments. Figure 3.5 shows the average 
absolute differences between stated beliefs and real choices in each period for the four 
treatments. The accuracy becomes higher and higher with repeated trials in all treatments (p-
values < 0.001 by comparing the observations from the first 10 periods with those from the 
final 10 periods in each treatment with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Moreover, there is a 
significant distinction between the two globally stable treatments and the two non-globally 
stable treatments in the final 10 periods. The accuracy of stated beliefs in the two globally 
stable treatments is significantly higher than that in the two non-globally stable treatments (p-
values < 0.001 by the Dunn’s tests), but there are no significant differences between the two 
globally stable treatments (p-value = 0.1185) and between the two non-globally stable 
treatments (p-value = 0.2263).  
                                                          
32 One might think that the sample autocorrelation of individual contributions is also a way to 
check for the pulsing behavior. However, if players within the same group are not synchronized, 
the pulsing behavior of each subject is not related to the non-globally stable argument. Thus, we 
check only the sample autocorrelation of the group’s total contributions.  
33 The pulsing contributions will induce negative sample autocorrelations for the groups’ total 
contributions in some groups. Thus, the sample autocorrelations in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8) 
should be smaller than those in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4). 
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      The non-global stability suggests that, if subjects follow the Cournot best-response 
dynamics, the distance between beliefs and choices will become larger and larger in the non-
converged groups. To verify this, we checked dynamics of belief accuracy in each group. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation tests show that the average difference at the group level 
significantly increases in only one group from treatment (10, 6, 6) (Spearman’s rho = 0.4214, p-
value = 0.0359) and two groups from treatment (10, 8, 8) (Spearman’s rho = 0.5661 and 0.4661, 
p-values < 0.05). 
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Average absolute differences between stated beliefs and real choices at each period 
 
       Then, we release the assumption of myopic Cournot learning and empirically investigate 
the belief formation processes of subjects.34 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) suggest that belief 
formation in a linear VCM environment can be regarded as a weighted average of the belief 
and the observation of the previous period.35 Since this weighted average could be expressed 
                                                          
34 The term “myopic Cournot learning,” also called naive learning (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter 
2010), means players’ beliefs are equal to the most recent observation.   
35 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) also provide an intuitive interpretation for this argument. “In 
period 1 a subject can only rely on his or her intuitive (‘home-grown’) beliefs about others’ 
contributions. In period 2, he or she also makes an observation about others’ actual contribution in 
period 1. A subject may therefore update his or her period 2 belief on the basis of his or her period 1 
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as a weighted average of all previous observations and the prior belief, we introduce a model 
to estimate the belief formation process, using the argument of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
as an assumption.36 The model is expressed as follows: 
           
         𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 =
𝑠𝑗,𝑡+∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡−𝑢
𝑡−1
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡
1−𝛾𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑗,1
1+∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑡−1
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡
1−𝛾𝑖
,                                                                                           (3.6) 
 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 is player i’s belief about the contribution of player j at period t + 1, 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is the 
contribution of player j at period t, 𝛾𝑖
𝑢 is the weight given to the observation of 𝑠𝑗,𝑡−𝑢 at period t 
– u, and 𝐵𝑖𝑗,1 is the stated belief about the contribution of player j at period 1.37  
        However, although the rewarding structure for eliciting beliefs in our design is similar to 
that of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), we elicit beliefs about individual contributions. In 
contrast, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit beliefs about the average contributions of other 
group members. Therefore, an alternative model that can explain the belief-formation process 
in our experimental data is the smoothed (or noisy) 𝛾-weighted fictitious play model (see 
Cheung and Friedman 1997; Fudenberg and Levine 1998). To distinguish between these two 
models, we conduct a model selection procedure. The results indicate that the argument of 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) outperforms the smoothed γ-weighted fictitious play model in 
explaining the belief-formation process at the aggregate level.38    
       Then, we extend the analysis to the individual level. Define 𝛾𝑖
∗ ∈ [0, 1) for player i, which 
minimizes the sum of the squared errors (SSE) between the stated beliefs and the beliefs 
suggested by equation (3.6).39 That is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
beliefs and the observed period 1 contributions by others. A similar logic might hold in all 
remaining periods” (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010, p. 548).  
36 We also conduct regressions of three models to check the lag length of the information used by 
players. The first is the same as Model 3 in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), which includes “belief (t 
– 1)” and “other’s contribution (t – 1)”. The second and third models include additional lagged 
variables. The results show that the argument of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) is a reasonable 
assumption to explain the belief-formation process in our experiment. See Section 3 of the 
supplementary documents for details. 
37 See the appendix for the derivation of this model. 
38 See Section 4 of the supplementary documents for details. 
39 As Cheung and Friedman (1997) suggested, 𝛾𝑖
∗ might also be located outside the range [0, 1). Such 
cases are relatively counter-intuitive. Here, 𝛾𝑖
∗ > 1 indicates that player i pays more attention to old 
information than to recent information, and the effect of the prior belief is negative. Then,  𝛾𝑖
∗ < 0 
indicates that the effect of past information changes sign in each period. However, in our empirical 
analysis, since we are only interested how subjects form their stated beliefs based on the weighted 
average over all previous observations and their prior beliefs, we omit the discussion on those 
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      𝛾𝑖
∗ = arg 𝑚𝑖𝑛0≤𝛾𝑖<1{∑ (𝐵𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
225
𝑡=2 },                                                                                 (3.7) 
 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is player i’s stated belief on player j’s contribution at period t, and 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the 
constructed belief at period t given by equation (3.6). Here, 𝛾𝑖
∗ should be equal to 0 when 
player i exactly follows the myopic Cournot learning process. In contrast, 𝛾𝑖
∗ is close to 1 if 
player i pay much attention to previous observations and his/her prior belief. In this sense, 
this model is close to the k-period average model of Healy (2006) but assigns a high weight to 
the prior belief.  Briefly, the empirical model of equation (3.6) can be regarded as a time-
weighted average model, including the prior belief. Equation (3.7) is calculated twice for each 
individual because, in each period, each subject states two beliefs about the individual 
contributions of the other two players in the group.40 
  
Result 3.2: (Belief formation) The belief-formation processes of subjects are significantly more 
myopic in the two globally stable treatments than they are in treatment (10, 8, 8). Furthermore, 
the minimal SSE in the two non-globally stable treatments are significantly larger than those in 
the two globally stable treatments. 
 
Support: Penal A of Figure 3.6 shows the distributions of 𝛾𝑖
∗ in the four treatments. The left-
most bar decreases continuously from treatment (10, 2, 2) to treatment (10, 8, 8). This decrease 
has a significant impact on the distribution in treatment (10, 8, 8), which is significantly 
different to the distributions in treatments (10, 2, 2) (p-value = 0.006) and (10, 4, 4) (p-value = 
0.008), based on the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The Kruskal–Wallis test also 
shows a significant difference in the distributions of 𝛾𝑖
∗ among the four treatments (d.f. = 3, p-
value = 0.0121). Furthermore, Dunn’s test shows that 𝛾𝑖
∗ in treatment (10, 8, 8) is significantly 
larger than that in treatments (10, 2, 2) (p-value = 0.0246) and (10, 4, 4) (p-value = 0.0082). 
Comparing minimal SSE from the four treatments, the Kruskal-Wallis test also shows a 
significant difference (d.f. = 3, p-value = 0.0001), and Dunn’s test further shows that the 
minimal SSE from treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4) are significantly smaller than those from 
treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8) (p-values < 0.01).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
counter-intuitive situations. This design can also be found in the analysis of the belief-formation 
process in Hyndman et al. (2012).  
40 In 19 cases (eight cases in treatment (10, 2, 2), six cases in treatment (10, 4, 4), four cases in 
treatment (10, 6, 6), and one case in treatment (10, 8, 8)), players’ prior beliefs were equal to their 
group members’ contributions, and their group members did not change their contributions during 
the experiment. In such cases, since 𝛾
𝑖
 is canceled out in equation (3.6), we eliminate these data. The 
calculations were carried out 725 times. 
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Penal A: Periods 2-25 
 
Penal B: Periods 2-11 
 
Fig. 3.6 Distributions of 𝛾𝑖
∗ in the four treatments 
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       Moreover, note that, for the two globally stable games, many groups converge to the Nash 
equilibrium, which means that beliefs will converge too. This might make 𝛾𝑖
∗ a bit bias to zero. 
To rule out this problem, we conduct the estimations with the data from periods 2-11 as a 
double check. The results are shown in Penal B of Figure 3.6. These graphs are very similar to 
those in Penal A. Actually, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that players in treatment (10, 6, 
6) are significantly more myopic in periods 2-11 than they are in periods 2-25 (p-value = 
0.0295), and it shows insignificant results in the other three treatments (p-value = 0.8096 for 
treatment (10, 2, 2), p-value = 0.2452 for treatment (10, 4, 4), and p-value = 0.7410 for treatment 
(10, 8, 8)). More importantly, the Dunn’s tests show that, in periods 2-11, the differences in 𝛾𝑖
∗ 
and minimal SSE between the two globally stable treatments and treatment (10, 8, 8) are 
consistent with the above results (p-values < 0.05).    
       Result 3.2 is rather interesting. It could indicate that when the system could approach 
equilibrium using the myopic Cournot learning process, subjects might be willing to follow 
this process because it incurs less of a cognitive cost than that of processing information from 
previous periods. However, when the system cannot approach equilibrium with the myopic 
Cournot learning process, subjects might have to process more previous information and, thus, 
incur greater cognitive costs.41 We consider this interpretation in the simulation section to 
show whether this change in the belief-formation process improves the stability of the system. 
In addition, the difference in the minimal SSEs across treatments might be the result of a 
higher number of decision errors in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8) than in treatments (10, 2, 
2) and (10, 4, 4). However, the difference might also suggest that subjects employ more 
information beyond those of historical observations on choices in the two non-globally stable 
treatments.42 
 
3.4.3 Responding Process  
In this subsection, we release the assumption that players make self-interested maximization 
choices and empirically investigate subjects’ response processes. Since many experimental 
studies suggest that most players are conditional cooperators who always want to match the 
(average) contributions of other players (see Chaudhuri 2011), we incorporate this behavioral 
pattern into our empirical analysis.  
       Our experimental design includes three players and two roles in each group. Players with 
investor number = 1 might match the average of beliefs about the contributions of investor 2 or 
3 because the latter two players have the same payoff table. However, players with investor 
                                                          
41 Theoretically, when subjects take more previous observations into consideration, i.e. the fictitious 
play or best response to the average of all previous observations, the global stability at the Nash 
equilibrium will generally be improved (e.g., Thorlund-Petersen 1990; Hofbauser and Sandholm 
2002).  
42 See Milgrom and Roberts (1991) for a discussion on the different learning processes.  
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number = 2 or 3 may match the two beliefs separately because the other two players have 
different payoff tables.   
      Therefore, we assume different response processes for the two roles. Specifically, we 
assume that players with investor number = 1 adjust their contributions as follows: 
            
      𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(?̅?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + ε,                                                     (3.8) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is player i’s self-interested best response to his/her own stated beliefs at period t, 
and ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 is the average of the two beliefs held by player i about the contributions of the other 
two players. Then, investors 2 or 3 adjust their contributions as follows: 
     
      𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑖,𝑡
23 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + ε,                     (3.9) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is again player i’s self-interested best response to his/her own stated beliefs at 
period t, 𝐵𝑖,𝑡
1  is player i’s stated belief about the contribution of investor 1, and 𝐵𝑖,𝑡
23 is player i’s 
stated belief about the contribution of the other player with investor number = 2 or 3.  
       We employ difference forms in the regressions, which are inconsistent with previous 
studies (i.e. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)). The main justification is about multicollinearity. 
Note that beliefs enter the calculations of best responses and, particularly for investors 2 and 3, 
beliefs about the other same-role player’s contributions could be correlated with their own best 
response. Via making a difference form, we intend to reduce the correlation between 
independent variables in models (3.8) and (3.9). For the two independent variables of model 
(3.8), all the absolute values of Spearman’s rho are not larger than 0.36 and all the variance 
inflation factors are not larger than 1.12 in the four treatments. For the three independent 
variables in model (3.9), the maximum of the absolute values of Spearman’s rho is 0.6215 and 
the maximum of the variance inflation factors is 2.1186 among the four treatments. Therefore, 
all the variance inflation factors in our two models are smaller than the critical value of 10 
(Gujarati 2003).  
       These two regressions show the relative importance of the two behavioral patterns, namely 
self-interested maximization and matching beliefs, when players adjust their contributions.   
 
Results 3.3: (Response) The behavioral pattern of self-interested maximization accounts for a 
significantly larger proportion than that of matching beliefs does in the two globally stable 
treatments for players with investor number = 1 and in treatment (10, 2, 2) for players with 
investor number = 2 or 3. However, this is not the case in the two non-globally stable 
treatments for both roles. 
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Support: Table 3.3 shows the results of the above regressions.43 In each treatment, we compare 
the estimate of 𝛽1 to the estimate of 𝛽2  for players with investor number = 1 and compare the 
estimate of 𝛽1  to the sum of the estimates of 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 for players with investor number = 2 or 
3 (p-values are also reported in Table 3.3). Our results indicate that the behavioral pattern of 
self-interested maximization is significantly more common than that of matching beliefs in the 
two globally stable treatments for players with investor number = 1 and in treatment (10, 2, 2) 
for players with investor number = 2 or 3. However, this is not the case in the two non-globally 
stable treatments. Conversely, for players with investor number = 2 or 3 in treatment (10, 8, 8), 
the sum of the estimates of 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 is significantly larger than the estimate of 𝛽1.  
 
Table 3.3 Fixed-effects regressions for the response process 
Players with investor number = 1 
Dependent variable: 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
                                               Treatment (10,2,2)           Treatment (10,4,4)            Treatment (10,6,6)          Treatment (10,8,8) 
 𝛽1                                                     0.466***                          0.389***                            0.475***                            0.260*** 
                                                         (0.071)                               (0.051)                                (0.096)                               (0.060) 
𝛽2                                                     0.238***                          0.215***                            0.399***                            0.398*** 
                                                         (0.076)                               (0.044)                                (0.067)                               (0.061) 
α                                                        1.627***                          1.315***                            1.692***                            1.004*** 
                                                         (0.530)                               (0.217)                                (0.218)                               (0.144) 
P-value (𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2)                    0.013                                 0.024                                   0.529                                  0.158 
Subjects/Groups                            30/30                                 31/31                                  32/32                                  31/31 
Observations                                   720                                    744                                       768                                     744 
R-squared                                        0.24                                   0.21                                     0.34                                     0.26 
Players with investor number = 2 or 3 
Dependent variable: 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
                                               Treatment (10,2,2)           Treatment (10,4,4)            Treatment (10,6,6)          Treatment (10,8,8) 
 𝛽1                                                    0.583***                          0.450***                            0.375***                            0.261*** 
                                                         (0.118)                             (0.093)                                 (0.061)                               (0.031) 
 𝛽2                                                     0.023                                0.007                                   0.080*                                0.214*** 
                                                          
43 The regressions are conducted using a fixed-effects model with clustered groups to isolate 
unspecified individual traits and to control for unspecified intragroup influence. 
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                                                         (0.027)                             (0.034)                                 (0.040)                               (0.030) 
 𝛽3                                                     0.194***                         0.312***                             0.289***                           0.285*** 
                                                         (0.052)                             (0.042)                                 (0.065)                               (0.039) 
α                                                       0.203                                0.604**                               0.508**                             0.283*** 
                                                         (0.276)                             (0.292)                                 (0.235)                               (0.096) 
P-value (𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3)         0.035                                0.202                                    0.952                                 0.000 
Subjects/Groups                           60/30                                62/31                                   64/32                                 62/31 
Observations                                 1440                                  1488                                    1536                                   1488 
R-squared                                       0.34                                   0.27                                      0.26                                    0.27 
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at ∗ 10% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗∗∗ 1% level (all two-
tailed tests). 
 
         Furthermore, we conduct pairwise tests of the equivalence of the estimates of 𝛽2 across 
the four treatments with the seemingly unrelated regression. For players with investor number 
= 1, the estimates of 𝛽2 are not statistically significantly different between treatments (10, 2, 2) 
and (10, 6, 6) (p-value = 0.112), are slightly different between treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 8, 8) 
(p-value = 0.098), and are significantly different between treatments (10, 4, 4) and (10, 6, 6) (p-
value = 0.022) and between treatments (10, 4, 4) and (10, 8, 8) (p-value = 0.015). For players 
with investor number = 2 or 3, only the estimate of 𝛽2 in treatment (10, 8, 8) is significantly 
larger than that in the other three treatments (p-values < 0.01). These results suggest that 
players are less likely to match their beliefs about the contributions of players with different 
roles in the two globally stable treatments than they are in the two non-globally stable 
treatments. 
        For players with investor number = 1, the difference in conditional cooperation across the 
four treatments might stem from inequity aversion. As Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumed in 
their inequity-aversion utility model, players suffer more from inequity that is to their 
disadvantage than they do from inequity that is to their advantage. If checking the payoff tables 
in the supplementary documents, we can find that, in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4), the 
payoff of investor 1 increases much faster than the payoffs of the other two players when 
he/she unilaterally increases his/her own contribution. In contrast, in treatments (10, 6, 6) and 
(10, 8, 8), and especially in treatment (10, 8, 8), when investor 1 unilaterally increases his/her 
own contribution to 10 tokens, his/her own payoff becomes less than the payoffs of the other 
two players. Given this fact, investor 1 might be willing to contribute much more than investor 
2 or 3 do in the two globally stable treatments, but might not be willing to do so in the two 
non-globally stable treatments.  
        For players with investor number = 2 or 3, note that their MPCR varies between the four 
treatments. The difference in conditional cooperation, in particular, the difference in 𝛽2, across 
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the four treatments might stem from different magnitudes of opportunity costs when making 
contributions, in addition to social preferences. Because the benefits from keeping tokens for 
oneself are identical across the four treatments, the opportunity costs of contributions are 
continuously reduced from treatment (10, 2, 2) to treatment (10, 8, 8). Therefore, matching 
beliefs in treatment (10, 8, 8) induces lower costs than it does in treatment (10, 2, 2).   
       In the next section, we apply our empirical findings on the belief formation and response 
processes to the theory. We conduct a series of simulations to show whether the changes in the 
belief formation improve stability, to show how conditional cooperation affects convergence, 
and to explain our observations of the differences in the convergence of the contributions 
across the four treatments. 
 
3.5 Simulation 
We employ the simulation method because it allows us to compare the outcomes generated by 
different counterfactual assumptions. This method was also used by Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2010). We use a 2 × 2 simulation design to investigate the individual effects of the belief-
formation process and the response process. Table 4 summaries the simulation design. All 
simulations are conducted using the initial contributions of the subjects in our experiments.   
  
Table 3.4  2x2 Design of the simulation 
  Treatments                                                                                   Belief formation         
 Responding process                      Myopic Cournot learning                Empirical learning(each individual)               
Self-interested best                                       CS (baseline)                                        EiS 
response 
Empirical Responding                                   CEr                                                         EiEr 
 process(each role) 
 
              As shown in Table 3.4, the baseline treatment combines the myopic Cournot learning 
with the self-interested best response. We, therefore, refer to it as the CS treatment. It checks 
the theoretical predictions against the initial contributions in each group. By replacing myopic 
Cournot learning with the empirical estimates (periods 2-25) at the individual level in section 
3.4.2, but keeping the assumption of the self-interested best response, we get the EiS 
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treatment.44 By comparing the outcomes of the CS treatment and the EiS treatment, we isolate 
the effect of the empirical belief-formation process.45 Furthermore, by replacing the self-
interested best response with the empirical response process shown in Table 3.3, but keeping 
the assumption of myopic Cournot learning, we get the CEr treatment. Similarly, comparing 
the outcomes of the CS treatment and the CEr treatment, we isolate the effect of the empirical 
response process. Then, by comparing the EiEr treatment to the other three treatments, we can 
observe the joint effect of the empirical belief-formation process and the empirical response 
process. Finally, since we do not have individual response processes, the experimental 
observations will serve as a treatment for both the empirical belief-formation process and the 
empirical response process at the individual level. 
 
Penal: Treatment (10, 2, 2) 
 
                                                          
44 The empirical belief formation process indicates the equation (3.6) with estimates of 𝛾𝑖
∗ for each 
individual. Similarly, the empirical response process indicates models (3.8) and (3.9) with the 
estimates shown in Table 3.3 for each role.  
45 Recall that we do not have estimates for 19 cases of our experimental data. Since each subject 
needs to predict twice in our experiment, for those who have only one estimate, we simply use the 
estimate for both belief formation processes. Furthermore, for those subjects who do not have both 
estimates available, we keep the assumption of myopic Cournot learning.    
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Penal B: Treatment (10, 4, 4) 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
A
V
ER
A
G
E 
C
O
N
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
PERIOD
PLAYERS WITH INVESTOR NUMEBR = 2  OR 3
CS EiS CEr EiEr Experiment
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
A
V
ER
A
G
E 
C
O
N
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
PERIOD
PLAYERS WITH INVESTOR NUMBER =1
CS EiS CEr EiEr Experiment
88 
 
 
 
Penal C: Treatment (10, 6, 6) 
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Penal D: Treatment (10, 8, 8) 
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Fig. 3.7 Average contribution per period of simulation results for each role of players in four treatments 
 
         Figure 3.7 shows the average contribution in each period for each role, generated from 
these simulations and the experimental observations. First, the simulation results between the 
CS treatment and the EiS treatment are very similar in treatments (10, 2, 2) and (10, 4, 4). 
However, they are quite different in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8). As predicted by Saijo 
(2015), at the group level, the simulation results show that 18 of 32 groups in treatment (10, 6, 6) 
and 30 of 31 groups in treatment (10, 8, 8) begin unstable pulsing in the CS treatment. Thus, we 
see significant pulsing in the averages. However, in the EiS treatment, no group enters 
unstable pulsing.46 Therefore, we conclude that the adaptive change in the belief-formation 
process improves the stability of the system in treatments (10, 6, 6) and (10, 8, 8).  
       Second, to compare the prediction power of these simulations, we calculate the prediction 
errors for each subject at each period.47 By comparing the prediction errors across these 
simulation treatments, the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that the simulation results from 
the CEr treatment and the EiEr treatment are quite similar in treatments (10, 2, 2) (p-value = 
0.8673) and (10, 4, 4) (p-value = 0.6966). However, the simulation results from the EiEr 
                                                          
46 Even though there is no unstable pulsing, four groups in treatment (10, 6, 6) and seven groups in 
treatment (10, 8, 8) still do not reach the unique Nash equilibrium within 25 periods in the 
simulation of the EiS treatment. 
47 The prediction error is the absolute difference (|𝑝𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖
𝑡|) between the simulation result (𝑝𝑖
𝑡) and 
the experimental observation (𝑠𝑖
𝑡) for subject i at period t (similar to the analysis in Healy (2006)). 
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treatment are more accurate than those from the CEr treatment in treatments (10, 6, 6) (p-value 
< 0.001) and (10, 8, 8) (p-value < 0.001), although Figure 7 shows that their averages are similar. 
Furthermore, the simulation results from the CEr and EiEr treatments are more accurate than 
those from the other two simulation treatments (CS and EiS) in all experimental treatments (all 
p-values < 0.001, by the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). Briefly, the simulation results from the 
EiEr treatment are closest to the experimental observations among these simulation treatments. 
These results confirm that the empirical belief-formation processes are close to myopic 
Cournot learning in the two globally stable treatments, and indicate that the differences in both 
the belief-formation and response processes contribute to the difference in the convergence of 
contributions across the four experimental treatments.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
We have investigated the convergence of contribution behavior in VCM experiments with 
heterogeneous quasi-linear payoff functions. Four experimental treatments with different 
heterogeneous settings are designed to share an identical Nash equilibrium, but with different 
stability properties. We clearly observe a significant difference in the convergence of 
contributions across the four treatments. The Nash equilibrium is a good predictor for the two 
globally stable treatments, but not for the two non-globally stable treatments. In the two non-
globally stable treatments, the players that benefit more from the public good contribute far 
less than the Nash prediction, while the players that benefit less contribute much more than 
the Nash prediction. The overall result is that the groups’ total contributions from the four 
treatments with different average marginal per capita returns are not significantly different in 
the final 10 periods.  
        By estimating subject’s belief-formation and response processes, we find significant 
differences in both of them across treatments. Our experimental results indicate that the 
decision-making processes of subjects are closer to the assumption of Cournot best-response 
dynamics in the two globally stable treatments than they are in the two non-globally stable 
treatments. Moreover, using simulations, we find that the changes in the belief-formation 
process improve the stability of the system in the two non-globally stable treatments and that 
the differences across treatments in the convergence of the contributions come from the 
differences in both the belief-formation and response processes. 
       Our experimental findings might give some insights for the observation that the 
contribution from some particular individual/company accounts for more than 90% of the 
total contribution in a practical VCM situation, for example, the voluntary contributions to 
build anti-tsunami embankments at Hamamatsu city in Japan (Saijo, 2015). However, note that, 
in most real situations, the condition, 𝑎1 > ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=2 , in Proposition 2 is not satisfied, which 
indicates the unique Nash equilibrium is not a good predictor in those situations. Our 
experimental results show that, in the two non-globally stable treatments, although the 
contributions are not converging to the Nash equilibrium, they are also not pulsing. These 
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experimental results might imply that they converge to some other equilibria (such as some 
inequity-averse equilibria). 
       Although two treatments in our experiment are non-globally stable based on the theory of 
Saijo (2015), our experimental results suggest that subjects’ belief-formation and response 
processes are, to a large extent, inconsistent with the Cournot best-response dynamics. Our 
observations of differences in the belief-formation process across treatments might indicate 
that the cognitive ability of human subjects can proactively choose the range of information 
used and employ different learning processes in situations with different stability properties. 
However, in the two non-globally stable treatments, because of the presence of conditional 
cooperation in the response process, the source of these adaptive changes in the belief-
formation process still needs further studies. This finding also raises a new question, can these 
adaptive changes maintain the stability of the system in an asymmetric quasi-linear VCM 
environment, if the number of players increases? 
         In our VCM experiment with quasi-linear payoff functions, we find that the argument of 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) explains the belief-formation process quite well. Therefore, we 
adopt their argument as an assumption and extend the analysis of the belief-formation process 
to the individual level. We suggest that this model is similar to the γ-weighted fictitious play 
model in Cheung and Friedman (1997), applied when players are more likely to be forming 
their beliefs using the average of historical observations rather than using the probability 
distribution. 
        Finally, Ledyard (1995) surveys the literature on VCM experiments with heterogeneous 
benefits in a linear environment, and conjectures that heterogeneous benefits have a negative 
effect on contributions and, thus, calls for additional research. Although our study is 
conducted in a quasi-linear environment, we find an interesting result. The decision-making 
processes of players are significantly different across different heterogeneous designs, but the 
groups’ total contributions are not statistically different in the final 10 periods of the 
experiment. This observation is also related to the convergence of contributions in the two non-
globally stable treatment. Related issues still need further studies.     
 
Appendix 
The derivation of equation (3.6).  We begin with the argument of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). 
The belief at period t can be expressed as the weighted average of the last observation and the 
belief in period t – 1. That is,       
      𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾𝑖)𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 
where 𝛾𝑖 ∈ [0,1) is the weighting factor. Then, we have the following series of equations: 
      𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 = (1 − 𝛾𝑖)𝑠𝑗,𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡−2, 
      𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡−2 = (1 − 𝛾𝑖)𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3 + 𝛾𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡−3, 
      …… 
       𝑏𝑖𝑗,2 = (1 − 𝛾𝑖)𝑠𝑗,1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗,1. 
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After substituting all equations into the first equation, we have, 
       𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − γ𝑖  )𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + γ𝑖(1 − γ𝑖  )𝑠𝑗,𝑡−2 + γ𝑖
2(1 − γ𝑖  )𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3 + ⋯ + γ𝑖
𝑡−2(1 − γ𝑖  )𝑠𝑗,1 + γ𝑖
𝑡−1𝑏𝑖𝑗,1 
               = (1 − γ𝑖)[𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + γ𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡−2 + γ𝑖
2𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3 + ⋯ + γ𝑖
𝑡−2𝑠𝑗,1 +
γ𝑖
𝑡−1
1−γ𝑖
𝑏𝑖𝑗,1] 
               =
𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1+∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1−𝑢
𝑡−2
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡−1
1−𝛾𝑖
𝑏𝑖𝑗,1
1
1−γ𝑖
.                                                                                              (A3.1) 
Since  
1
1−γ𝑖
= 1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑡−2
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡−1
1−𝛾𝑖
, equation (A3.1) is exactly equation (3.6). 
 
Supplementary Documents 
1. Instructions and payoff tables in our experiments. 
There are one instruction and five payoff tables in this supplementary document. All 
treatments use the same instructions but different payoff tables in the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. At the end of today's session you 
will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain silent and do not look at 
other people's work. Please turn off your cell phone and don’t talk with others. If you have any 
questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand. If you exclaim out loud or 
violate any of the rules explained below, you may be asked to leave and will not be paid. 
We thank you for your cooperation in this regard. 
 
Overview 
There will be 25 decision-making rounds in this experiment. You will each complete two tasks 
in each of these rounds. At the end of each round you will be informed your earnings for that 
round on the PC screen. The rules are identical in every round.  
In the first round you will be randomly assigned to a group. Each group consists of 3 
members. When groups are created, each of you will be randomly given an Investor Number 
(1, 2 or 3). These numbers and the composition of your group will be fixed in every round. You 
will not know which of the other people in the experiment are in your group in any given 
round.  
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At the end of the session, one of two tasks will be randomly drawn. You will be paid the 
total of your earnings from the chosen task for the 25 rounds.  
 
Rules 
In each round you and your group members each have 12 tokens to allocate. Each of you must 
decide how many tokens you want to invest in a project. Returns for all possible allocations are 
listed in the 'Earnings Tables'. There are two Earnings Tables (table 1 and table 2) with 
different payoff structures in the appendix. The player whose investor number is 1, is 
corresponding to table 1. All other two players are corresponding to table 2. When the 
experiment begins, you should enter your decisions in the blanks on the screen. Your entries 
on the blanks must be whole numbers between 0 and 12. At the same time, you also need make 
a prediction regarding the individual investments of the other two members in your group.  
After everyone has made the decision and prediction, the computer will display the 
decisions of other two players in your group. You can record the entries that the computer has 
reported and compute your earnings according to the Earning Tables. The following 
illustrations show how to use the payoff table to compute your incomes from the investment 
task. In each round, you investment income depends on your own investment and the total 
investments from the other two group members. You can find the line corresponding to your 
own investment and the column corresponding to the total investment of other two group 
members. The number at the intersection of the line and the column is your payoff in that 
round.   
You also will gain an additional income from your prediction (since there are two other 
members in your group, the prediction incomes will be computed separately and summed 
together). The formula of this additional income is, 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑟𝑏 = {
150, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑗
𝑏 = 𝑠𝑗
𝑟  
100
|𝑠𝑗
𝑏−𝑠𝑗
𝑟|
,   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑗
𝑏 ≠ 𝑠𝑗
𝑟 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2,3, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ,  
 
where 𝑠𝑗
𝑏 is your prediction about the investment from the group member j and 𝑠𝑗
𝑟 is the 
observed investment from group member j. This formula means that if your prediction about 
player j’s investment is exactly equal to his/her investment, you will get 150 experimental 
dollars. If they are different, you will get 100 divided by the difference.   
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Next, you will check to see if your calculation is consistent with the reported on the 
screen. It is very important that we both make this calculation and consistence. If your 
calculation differs from the computer’s or if you are unsure about how to compute your 
earnings in any round, please raise your hand. When all things are correct, the next round will 
begin. 
Finally, at the end of today’s session, the experimenter will invite three subjects to decide 
the incomes from which task will be set as the basis of your earnings for today’s experiment. 
Six cards (5 cards with numbers and one card with pictures) will be presented. Three subjects 
discuss and draw one card from these six cards. If the drawn card is the card with numbers, 
the incomes from the investment task will be the basis of the earnings of today’s experiment. In 
contrast, if the drawn card is the card with pictures, the incomes from the prediction task will 
be the basis of the earnings of today’s experiment. The exchange rate is 130 experimental 
dollars to 1 Chinese yuan. 
 
Final Remarks 
(1) Two Earnings Tables. Subject with investor number 1 is using table 1. Other two players are 
using table 2.  
(2) This session will consist of 25 rounds. 
(3) In each round, you and every other member of your group will each have 12 tokens to 
allocate.  
(4) In each round, you will decide how many tokens to invest in the project. The decision must 
be an integer and within the range of [0, 12].  
(5) In each round, you will predict the individual investments from other two players. The 
prediction must be an integer and within the range of [0, 12]. 
(6) Your earnings from the investment depend on your decision and the total investment from 
other two players. 
(7) Your earnings from the prediction depend on the distance between the prediction value 
and the observed value.  
(8) The members in your group will be fixed in each round. 
(9) The total income from one task (investment task or prediction task) will be randomly 
chosen as the basis of the earnings of today’s experiment. The exchange rate is 130 
experimental dollars to 1 Chinese yuan. 
(10) Do not discuss your decisions with other subjects. 
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Are there any questions? 
 
If all things are clear, please click “next” on your screen and finish those questions. Note that 
the purpose of those questions is only to make you understand the instructions and your 
answers will not affect your earnings in the experiment. 
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Payoff tables 
In each treatment, two payoff tables will be presented. For example, in treatment (10,2,2), the payoff tables with 𝑎𝑖 = 10 and 𝑎𝑖 = 2 will be presented to subjects. The yellow color blocks show the best response line in each payoff table, but 
is not presented during the experiment.    
1. 𝑎𝑖 = 10 
your contribution / 
the total contribution 
of others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0 120.0 196.2 240.8 272.5 297.0 317.1 334.1 348.7 361.7 373.3 383.8 393.3 402.1 410.3 417.9 425.0 431.7 437.9 443.9 449.5 454.9 460.0 464.9 469.6 474.1 
1 186.2 230.8 262.5 287.0 307.1 324.1 338.7 351.7 363.3 373.8 383.3 392.1 400.3 407.9 415.0 421.7 427.9 433.9 439.5 444.9 450.0 454.9 459.6 464.1 468.4 
2 220.8 252.5 277.0 297.1 314.1 328.7 341.7 353.3 363.8 373.3 382.1 390.3 397.9 405.0 411.7 417.9 423.9 429.5 434.9 440.0 444.9 449.6 454.1 458.4 462.5 
3 242.5 267.0 287.1 304.1 318.7 331.7 343.3 353.8 363.3 372.1 380.3 387.9 395.0 401.7 407.9 413.9 419.5 424.9 430.0 434.9 439.6 444.1 448.4 452.5 456.5 
4 257.0 277.1 294.1 308.7 321.7 333.3 343.8 353.3 362.1 370.3 377.9 385.0 391.7 397.9 403.9 409.5 414.9 420.0 424.9 429.6 434.1 438.4 442.5 446.5 450.4 
5 267.1 284.1 298.7 311.7 323.3 333.8 343.3 352.1 360.3 367.9 375.0 381.7 387.9 393.9 399.5 404.9 410.0 414.9 419.6 424.1 428.4 432.5 436.5 440.4 444.1 
6 274.1 288.7 301.7 313.3 323.8 333.3 342.1 350.3 357.9 365.0 371.7 377.9 383.9 389.5 394.9 400.0 404.9 409.6 414.1 418.4 422.5 426.5 430.4 434.1 437.7 
7 278.7 291.7 303.3 313.8 323.3 332.1 340.3 347.9 355.0 361.7 367.9 373.9 379.5 384.9 390.0 394.9 399.6 404.1 408.4 412.5 416.5 420.4 424.1 427.7 431.2 
8 281.7 293.3 303.8 313.3 322.1 330.3 337.9 345.0 351.7 357.9 363.9 369.5 374.9 380.0 384.9 389.6 394.1 398.4 402.5 406.5 410.4 414.1 417.7 421.2 424.6 
9 283.3 293.8 303.3 312.1 320.3 327.9 335.0 341.7 347.9 353.9 359.5 364.9 370.0 374.9 379.6 384.1 388.4 392.5 396.5 400.4 404.1 407.7 411.2 414.6 417.9 
10 283.8 293.3 302.1 310.3 317.9 325.0 331.7 337.9 343.9 349.5 354.9 360.0 364.9 369.6 374.1 378.4 382.5 386.5 390.4 394.1 397.7 401.2 404.6 407.9 411.1 
11 283.3 292.1 300.3 307.9 315.0 321.7 327.9 333.9 339.5 344.9 350.0 354.9 359.6 364.1 368.4 372.5 376.5 380.4 384.1 387.7 391.2 394.6 397.9 401.1 404.2 
12 282.1 290.3 297.9 305.0 311.7 317.9 323.9 329.5 334.9 340.0 344.9 349.6 354.1 358.4 362.5 366.5 370.4 374.1 377.7 381.2 384.6 387.9 391.1 394.2 397.2 
2. 𝑎𝑖 = 8 
your contribution / 
the total contribution 
of others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0 120.0 182.4 218.9 244.8 264.8 281.3 295.1 307.1 317.8 327.2 335.8 343.6 350.8 357.5 363.7 369.5 375.0 380.1 385.0 389.6 394.0 398.2 402.2 406.0 409.7 
1 172.4 208.9 234.8 254.8 271.3 285.1 297.1 307.8 317.2 325.8 333.6 340.8 347.5 353.7 359.5 365.0 370.1 375.0 379.6 384.0 388.2 392.2 396.0 399.7 403.2 
2 198.9 224.8 244.8 261.3 275.1 287.1 297.8 307.2 315.8 323.6 330.8 337.5 343.7 349.5 355.0 360.1 365.0 369.6 374.0 378.2 382.2 386.0 389.7 393.2 396.6 
3 214.8 234.8 251.3 265.1 277.1 287.8 297.2 305.8 313.6 320.8 327.5 333.7 339.5 345.0 350.1 355.0 359.6 364.0 368.2 372.2 376.0 379.7 383.2 386.6 389.9 
4 224.8 241.3 255.1 267.1 277.8 287.2 295.8 303.6 310.8 317.5 323.7 329.5 335.0 340.1 345.0 349.6 354.0 358.2 362.2 366.0 369.7 373.2 376.6 379.9 383.1 
5 231.3 245.1 257.1 267.8 277.2 285.8 293.6 300.8 307.5 313.7 319.5 325.0 330.1 335.0 339.6 344.0 348.2 352.2 356.0 359.7 363.2 366.6 369.9 373.1 376.1 
6 235.1 247.1 257.8 267.2 275.8 283.6 290.8 297.5 303.7 309.5 315.0 320.1 325.0 329.6 334.0 338.2 342.2 346.0 349.7 353.2 356.6 359.9 363.1 366.1 369.1 
7 237.1 247.8 257.2 265.8 273.6 280.8 287.5 293.7 299.5 305.0 310.1 315.0 319.6 324.0 328.2 332.2 336.0 339.7 343.2 346.6 349.9 353.1 356.1 359.1 361.9 
8 237.8 247.2 255.8 263.6 270.8 277.5 283.7 289.5 295.0 300.1 305.0 309.6 314.0 318.2 322.2 326.0 329.7 333.2 336.6 339.9 343.1 346.1 349.1 351.9 354.7 
9 237.2 245.8 253.6 260.8 267.5 273.7 279.5 285.0 290.1 295.0 299.6 304.0 308.2 312.2 316.0 319.7 323.2 326.6 329.9 333.1 336.1 339.1 341.9 344.7 347.4 
10 235.8 243.6 250.8 257.5 263.7 269.5 275.0 280.1 285.0 289.6 294.0 298.2 302.2 306.0 309.7 313.2 316.6 319.9 323.1 326.1 329.1 331.9 334.7 337.4 340.0 
11 233.6 240.8 247.5 253.7 259.5 265.0 270.1 275.0 279.6 284.0 288.2 292.2 296.0 299.7 303.2 306.6 309.9 313.1 316.1 319.1 321.9 324.7 327.4 330.0 332.5 
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12 230.8 237.5 243.7 249.5 255.0 260.1 265.0 269.6 274.0 278.2 282.2 286.0 289.7 293.2 296.6 299.9 303.1 306.1 309.1 311.9 314.7 317.4 320.0 322.5 325.0 
3. 𝑎𝑖 = 6 
your contribution / 
the total contribution 
of others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0 120.0 168.5 196.9 217.0 232.7 245.4 256.2 265.6 273.8 281.2 287.9 293.9 299.5 304.7 309.6 314.1 318.3 322.3 326.1 329.7 333.1 336.4 339.5 342.5 345.3 
1 158.5 186.9 207.0 222.7 235.4 246.2 255.6 263.8 271.2 277.9 283.9 289.5 294.7 299.6 304.1 308.3 312.3 316.1 319.7 323.1 326.4 329.5 332.5 335.3 338.1 
2 176.9 197.0 212.7 225.4 236.2 245.6 253.8 261.2 267.9 273.9 279.5 284.7 289.6 294.1 298.3 302.3 306.1 309.7 313.1 316.4 319.5 322.5 325.3 328.1 330.7 
3 187.0 202.7 215.4 226.2 235.6 243.8 251.2 257.9 263.9 269.5 274.7 279.6 284.1 288.3 292.3 296.1 299.7 303.1 306.4 309.5 312.5 315.3 318.1 320.7 323.3 
4 192.7 205.4 216.2 225.6 233.8 241.2 247.9 253.9 259.5 264.7 269.6 274.1 278.3 282.3 286.1 289.7 293.1 296.4 299.5 302.5 305.3 308.1 310.7 313.3 315.7 
5 195.4 206.2 215.6 223.8 231.2 237.9 243.9 249.5 254.7 259.6 264.1 268.3 272.3 276.1 279.7 283.1 286.4 289.5 292.5 295.3 298.1 300.7 303.3 305.7 308.1 
6 196.2 205.6 213.8 221.2 227.9 233.9 239.5 244.7 249.6 254.1 258.3 262.3 266.1 269.7 273.1 276.4 279.5 282.5 285.3 288.1 290.7 293.3 295.7 298.1 300.4 
7 195.6 203.8 211.2 217.9 223.9 229.5 234.7 239.6 244.1 248.3 252.3 256.1 259.7 263.1 266.4 269.5 272.5 275.3 278.1 280.7 283.3 285.7 288.1 290.4 292.6 
8 193.8 201.2 207.9 213.9 219.5 224.7 229.6 234.1 238.3 242.3 246.1 249.7 253.1 256.4 259.5 262.5 265.3 268.1 270.7 273.3 275.7 278.1 280.4 282.6 284.8 
9 191.2 197.9 203.9 209.5 214.7 219.6 224.1 228.3 232.3 236.1 239.7 243.1 246.4 249.5 252.5 255.3 258.1 260.7 263.3 265.7 268.1 270.4 272.6 274.8 276.8 
10 187.9 193.9 199.5 204.7 209.6 214.1 218.3 222.3 226.1 229.7 233.1 236.4 239.5 242.5 245.3 248.1 250.7 253.3 255.7 258.1 260.4 262.6 264.8 266.8 268.9 
11 183.9 189.5 194.7 199.6 204.1 208.3 212.3 216.1 219.7 223.1 226.4 229.5 232.5 235.3 238.1 240.7 243.3 245.7 248.1 250.4 252.6 254.8 256.8 258.9 260.8 
12 179.5 184.7 189.6 194.1 198.3 202.3 206.1 209.7 213.1 216.4 219.5 222.5 225.3 228.1 230.7 233.3 235.7 238.1 240.4 242.6 244.8 246.8 248.9 250.8 252.8 
 
4. 𝑎𝑖 = 4 
your contribution / 
the total contribution 
of others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0 120.0 154.7 174.9 189.3 200.5 209.6 217.3 224.0 229.9 235.1 239.9 244.2 248.2 252.0 255.4 258.6 261.7 264.5 267.2 269.8 272.2 274.6 276.8 278.9 280.9 
1 144.7 164.9 179.3 190.5 199.6 207.3 214.0 219.9 225.1 229.9 234.2 238.2 242.0 245.4 248.6 251.7 254.5 257.2 259.8 262.2 264.6 266.8 268.9 270.9 272.9 
2 154.9 169.3 180.5 189.6 197.3 204.0 209.9 215.1 219.9 224.2 228.2 232.0 235.4 238.6 241.7 244.5 247.2 249.8 252.2 254.6 256.8 258.9 260.9 262.9 264.8 
3 159.3 170.5 179.6 187.3 194.0 199.9 205.1 209.9 214.2 218.2 222.0 225.4 228.6 231.7 234.5 237.2 239.8 242.2 244.6 246.8 248.9 250.9 252.9 254.8 256.6 
4 160.5 169.6 177.3 184.0 189.9 195.1 199.9 204.2 208.2 212.0 215.4 218.6 221.7 224.5 227.2 229.8 232.2 234.6 236.8 238.9 240.9 242.9 244.8 246.6 248.4 
5 159.6 167.3 174.0 179.9 185.1 189.9 194.2 198.2 202.0 205.4 208.6 211.7 214.5 217.2 219.8 222.2 224.6 226.8 228.9 230.9 232.9 234.8 236.6 238.4 240.1 
6 157.3 164.0 169.9 175.1 179.9 184.2 188.2 192.0 195.4 198.6 201.7 204.5 207.2 209.8 212.2 214.6 216.8 218.9 220.9 222.9 224.8 226.6 228.4 230.1 231.7 
7 154.0 159.9 165.1 169.9 174.2 178.2 182.0 185.4 188.6 191.7 194.5 197.2 199.8 202.2 204.6 206.8 208.9 210.9 212.9 214.8 216.6 218.4 220.1 221.7 223.3 
8 149.9 155.1 159.9 164.2 168.2 172.0 175.4 178.6 181.7 184.5 187.2 189.8 192.2 194.6 196.8 198.9 200.9 202.9 204.8 206.6 208.4 210.1 211.7 213.3 214.8 
9 145.1 149.9 154.2 158.2 162.0 165.4 168.6 171.7 174.5 177.2 179.8 182.2 184.6 186.8 188.9 190.9 192.9 194.8 196.6 198.4 200.1 201.7 203.3 204.8 206.3 
10 139.9 144.2 148.2 152.0 155.4 158.6 161.7 164.5 167.2 169.8 172.2 174.6 176.8 178.9 180.9 182.9 184.8 186.6 188.4 190.1 191.7 193.3 194.8 196.3 197.8 
11 134.2 138.2 142.0 145.4 148.6 151.7 154.5 157.2 159.8 162.2 164.6 166.8 168.9 170.9 172.9 174.8 176.6 178.4 180.1 181.7 183.3 184.8 186.3 187.8 189.2 
12 128.2 132.0 135.4 138.6 141.7 144.5 147.2 149.8 152.2 154.6 156.8 158.9 160.9 162.9 164.8 166.6 168.4 170.1 171.7 173.3 174.8 176.3 177.8 179.2 180.5 
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5. 𝑎𝑖 = 2 
your contribution / 
the total contribution 
of others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
0 120.0 140.8 153.0 161.6 168.3 173.8 178.4 182.4 185.9 189.1 191.9 194.5 196.9 199.2 201.2 203.2 205.0 206.7 208.3 209.9 211.3 212.7 214.1 215.3 216.6 
1 130.8 143.0 151.6 158.3 163.8 168.4 172.4 175.9 179.1 181.9 184.5 186.9 189.2 191.2 193.2 195.0 196.7 198.3 199.9 201.3 202.7 204.1 205.3 206.6 207.7 
2 133.0 141.6 148.3 153.8 158.4 162.4 165.9 169.1 171.9 174.5 176.9 179.2 181.2 183.2 185.0 186.7 188.3 189.9 191.3 192.7 194.1 195.3 196.6 197.7 198.9 
3 131.6 138.3 143.8 148.4 152.4 155.9 159.1 161.9 164.5 166.9 169.2 171.2 173.2 175.0 176.7 178.3 179.9 181.3 182.7 184.1 185.3 186.6 187.7 188.9 190.0 
4 128.3 133.8 138.4 142.4 145.9 149.1 151.9 154.5 156.9 159.2 161.2 163.2 165.0 166.7 168.3 169.9 171.3 172.7 174.1 175.3 176.6 177.7 178.9 180.0 181.0 
5 123.8 128.4 132.4 135.9 139.1 141.9 144.5 146.9 149.2 151.2 153.2 155.0 156.7 158.3 159.9 161.3 162.7 164.1 165.3 166.6 167.7 168.9 170.0 171.0 172.0 
6 118.4 122.4 125.9 129.1 131.9 134.5 136.9 139.2 141.2 143.2 145.0 146.7 148.3 149.9 151.3 152.7 154.1 155.3 156.6 157.7 158.9 160.0 161.0 162.0 163.0 
7 112.4 115.9 119.1 121.9 124.5 126.9 129.2 131.2 133.2 135.0 136.7 138.3 139.9 141.3 142.7 144.1 145.3 146.6 147.7 148.9 150.0 151.0 152.0 153.0 154.0 
8 105.9 109.1 111.9 114.5 116.9 119.2 121.2 123.2 125.0 126.7 128.3 129.9 131.3 132.7 134.1 135.3 136.6 137.7 138.9 140.0 141.0 142.0 143.0 144.0 144.9 
9 99.1 101.9 104.5 106.9 109.2 111.2 113.2 115.0 116.7 118.3 119.9 121.3 122.7 124.1 125.3 126.6 127.7 128.9 130.0 131.0 132.0 133.0 134.0 134.9 135.8 
10 91.9 94.5 96.9 99.2 101.2 103.2 105.0 106.7 108.3 109.9 111.3 112.7 114.1 115.3 116.6 117.7 118.9 120.0 121.0 122.0 123.0 124.0 124.9 125.8 126.7 
11 84.5 86.9 89.2 91.2 93.2 95.0 96.7 98.3 99.9 101.3 102.7 104.1 105.3 106.6 107.7 108.9 110.0 111.0 112.0 113.0 114.0 114.9 115.8 116.7 117.5 
12 76.9 79.2 81.2 83.2 85.0 86.7 88.3 89.9 91.3 92.7 94.1 95.3 96.6 97.7 98.9 100.0 101.0 102.0 103.0 104.0 104.9 105.8 106.7 107.5 108.3 
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2. Experimental observations from two additional sessions. 
Since we conducted our experiments with a special design that we set different 
probabilities for the incomes from two tasks, which is different from the original design in 
Blanco et al. (2010), we also conducted two additional sessions (24 subjects for each, 48 
subjects in total) with the setting of treatment (10,8,8) using the equal probabilities for the 
incomes from two tasks. We call this two additional sessions as treatment (10,8,8)a. In this 
document, we report the experimental observations from treatment (10,8,8)a and compare 
it with the experimental observations from treatment (10,8,8). 
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Fig. S1 Average contribution at each period 
 
          Figure S1 shows the average contribution at each period for both experimental roles 
of players in treatments (10,8,8)a and (10,8,8). The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that the 
contributions from the players with investor number =1 in treatment (10,8,8)a are not 
significantly different from that in treatment (10,8,8) (p-value = 0.4586). However, for the 
players with investor number = 2 or 3, the contributions are significantly larger in 
treatment (10,8,8)a than in treatment (10,8,8) (p-value = 0.0202).  
          The only difference between the two treatments is the design of equal or different 
probabilities for the incomes from two tasks. Compared to treatment (10,8,8)a, the structure 
changes stem from the design of belief elicitation is relatively smaller in treatment (10,8,8). 
Therefore, the difference in contributions comes from the difference in structure changes 
between the two treatments. This experiment observation shows a consistent result with 
the experimental observation in Gächter and Renner (2010). They find that the structure 
changes generated from the belief elicitation with payment incentives increases the 
contributions in a linear VCM environment with a homogeneous design. 
3. The lag length of information used by players 
Three models are discussed to check the lag length of information used by players. The first 
one is the same as Model 3 in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), which includes “belief (t-1)” 
and “other’s contribution (t-1)”. The second and third models include additional lagged 
variables. The regressions are conducted over the pooled data of each treatment using the 
OLS model with clustered groups to control unspecified influence within the group.48  
 
Table S1 OLS regressions for belief formation 
Dependent variable: Belief (t) 
Model 1         
Variable                                Treatment (10,2,2)        Treatment (10,4,4)      Treatment (10,6,6)     Treatment (10,8,8)   
                                                          
48 Similar to the analysis in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), we also conduct these regressions 
with the random effect model, the fixed effect model and the Tobit model. All these regressions 
produce quite significant estimates for the coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2, but some of the 
estimates become insignificant in Model 3. These models also produce pretty high values for the 
R-squared (> 0.8 for treatments (10,2,2) and (10,4,4), > 0.6 for treatments (10,6,6) and (10,8,8)), 
except the Tobit model (around 0.35 for treatments (10,2,2) and (10,4,4) and around 0.2 for 
treatments (10,6,6) and (10,8,8)).  
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Belief (t-1)                                 0.472***                            0.425***                         0.409***                   0.396*** 
                                                   (0.038)                                 (0.025)                            (0.029)                       (0.027) 
Contribution (t-1)                    0.504***                            0.548***                          0.451***                  0.484*** 
                                                   (0.040)                                 (0.021)                            (0.060)                       (0.023) 
Constant                                   0.083*                                 0.173**                           0.585**                      0.516*** 
                                                   (0.044)                                 (0.075)                            (0.265)                       (0.103) 
Obs.                                            4320                                     4464                                4608                           4464 
R-squared                                   0.87                                      0.83                                 0.61                            0.62 
P-value (= 1)                            0.052                                    0.217                              0.042                          0.000                                           
Dependent variable: Belief (t) 
Model 2           
Variable                                Treatment (10,2,2)        Treatment (10,4,4)      Treatment (10,6,6)     Treatment (10,8,8)   
Belief (t-1)                                 0.292***                            0.243***                      0.142*                          0.240***                                                                           
                                                    (0.061)                                (0.060)                         (0.082)                         (0.037)          
Contribution(t-1)                     0.413***                            0.457***                      0.373***                     0.446***                                                   
                                                    (0.044)                                (0.034)                          (0.082)                        (0.030) 
Belief (t-2)                                0.173***                             0.110***                      0.200***                    0.141*** 
                                                   (0.035)                                 (0.021)                          (0.053)                        (0.019) 
Investment (t-2)                     0.123**                                0.190**                        0.246**                      0.110* 
                                                   (0.060)                                  (0.073)                         (0.097)                        (0.040) 
Constant                                  -0.002                                    0.070*                          0.166**                      0.231** 
                                                  (0.026)                                   (0.041)                          (0.065)                       (0.080) 
Obs.                                            4140                                      4278                             4416                           4278 
R-squared                                  0.89                                        0.85                             0.68                             0.65 
P-value (= 1)                            0.977                                     0.957                            0.046                          0.001                               
Dependent variable: Belief (t) 
Model 3           
Variable                                Treatment (10,2,2)        Treatment (10,4,4)      Treatment (10,6,6)     Treatment (10,8,8)   
Belief (t-1)                                 0.275***                               0.224**                     0.133**                         0.231*** 
                                                   (0.066)                                    (0.071)                       (0.072)                          (0.042) 
Contribution (t-1)                    0.402***                               0.443***                   0.359***                       0.435***                              
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                                                   (0.053)                                    (0.040)                      (0.075)                           (0.031) 
Belief (t-2)                                0.173***                                0.070**                     0.188**                         0.108*** 
                                                   (0.053)                                    (0.034)                       (0.080)                          (0.024) 
Contribution (t-2)                    0.123**                                  0.196**                     0.250**                         0.105* 
                                                   (0.054)                                    (0.071)                       (0.098)                          (0.039) 
Belief (t-3)                                0.085***                                0.094***                   0.082***                      0.076*** 
                                                   (0.020)                                    (0.027)                       (0.027)                          (0.015) 
Contribution (t-3)                    -0.053                                     -0.018                        -0.041                             0.004  
                                                   (0.058)                                    (0.035)                       (0.051)                          (0.016) 
Constant                                   -0.012                                       0.024                         0.095                              0.120 
                                                   (0.022)                                     (0.031)                      (0.066)                          (0.070) 
Obs.                                             3960                                       4092                          4224                              4092 
R-squared                                   0.90                                         0.86                           0.68                               0.65 
P-value (= 1)                             0.384                                      0.225                         0.137                             0.004 
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at ∗ 10% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗∗∗ 1% level (all 
two-tailed tests). 
 
        Table S1 shows the results of these regressions. All regressions produce a pretty high 
R-squared (> 0.8 for treatments (10,2,2) and (10,4,4) and > 0.6 for treatments (10,6,6) and 
(10,8,8)).  Moreover, in all treatments, the estimates of the coefficient of the lagged variable 
“other’s contribution (t-3)” are not significant, which indicates that the weighted 
observations should be limited within the previous two periods. We also report the p-
values in the table for testing whether the sum of the estimated coefficients is equal to one 
for each regression.49 It is accepted by all models in treatment (10,4,4) but rejected by all 
models in treatment (10,8,8). This result indicates that there is a systematic difference in the 
belief-formation process across the four treatments. Given these observations, we suggest 
that the argument from Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) also gives a reasonable explanation 
for the belief-formation process in our experiment. 
4. A model selection procedure for the belief-formation process 
In this document, we conduct a model selection procedure to compare the performance of 
two models in explaining the belief-formation process at the aggregate level in our 
experiment. 
                                                          
49 If the sum of coefficients is equal to one and the constant of the regression is insignificantly 
different from zero, it gives a perfect support for the argument of Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2010).    
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Model 1: The weighted average model   
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) claim a weighted averaging process in the belief-formation 
process of subjects in the experiment of a public goods game. That is equation (3.6) in the 
paper. Subject’s belief-formation process is a weighted average over all previous 
observations and his/her priori belief.  That is, 
           
           𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 =
𝑠𝑗,𝑡+∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡−𝑢
𝑡−1
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡
1−𝛾𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝑗,1
1+∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑢𝑡−1
𝑢=1 +
𝛾𝑖
𝑡
1−𝛾𝑖
,                                                                                         (s1) 
 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 is player i’s belief about the contribution of player j  at period t+1, 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is the 
contribution of player j at period t, 𝛾𝑖
𝑢 is a weight given to the observation of 𝑠𝑗,𝑡−𝑢 at period 
t-u, and 𝐵𝑖𝑗,1 is the prior stated belief about the contribution of player j at period 1. Define 
𝛾𝑖
∗ for the representative player that minimizes the sum of the squared errors (SSE) between 
the stated beliefs and the beliefs suggested by equation (s1). That is, 
  
            𝛾𝑖
∗ = arg 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {∑ ∑ (𝐵𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
225
𝑡=2
𝑁
𝑖=1 },                                                                        (s2) 
 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is player i’s stated belief about player j’s contribution at period t, and 𝑏𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the 
constructed belief at period t given by equation (s1). 
 
Model 2: The smoothed 𝛄-weighted fictitious play model  
A usual way to explain the belief-formation process in a normal form game is based on a 
distribution of historical observations (for example, the fictitious play).  Cheung and 
Friedman (1997) introduce the time decay into the fictitious play model, which is referred 
to as the γ-weighted fictitious play model. Furthermore, Fudenberg and Levine (1998) 
propose the smoothed fictitious play model to incorporate decision errors into the fictitious 
play. Therefore, in our experiment, the process of belief elicitation could be modeled by the 
smoothed γ-weighted fictitious play model. That is, players follow the γ-weighted fictitious 
play to form their underlying beliefs, and then report their stated beliefs via a stochastic 
response process. Therefore, the underlying belief is, 
            
            𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑘 =
1𝑡(𝑎
𝑘)+∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑢1𝑡−𝑢(𝑎
𝑘)𝑡−1𝑢=1
1+∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑢𝑡−1
𝑢=1
 ,                                                                                             (s3) 
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Where 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑘  is player i’s belief about the possibility that his/her opponent will choose 
action 𝑎𝑘 at period t+1, 1𝑡(𝑎
𝑘) is an indicator that equals to 1 if action 𝑎𝑘 is chosen at period 
t and 0 otherwise, and 𝛽𝑖
𝑢 is a weight given to the observation of 𝑎𝑘 at period t-u.  Then, 
based on this underlying belief, player i will form an expected payoff for each choice in the 
guessing task at period t. That is, 
 
           ?̅?𝑖
𝑡(𝐵𝑖,𝑡) = ∑ 𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑘12
𝑘=0 𝜋𝑖(𝐵𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑘) ,                                                                                             (s4) 
 
where k denotes a contribution of k tokens, 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is player i’s stated belief at period t, 𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is 
the constructed belief given by equation (s3), and 𝜋𝑖(𝐵𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑘) is the payoff from the guessing 
task, which is 150 when 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘 or 100/|𝐵𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑘| when 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 𝑘. This expected payoff 
function is maximized when player i report the choice with the highest probability he/she 
believes. Based on these expected payoffs, we assume subjects stated his/her belief via a 
stochastic response rule at period t. That is, 
   
            𝑟(𝐵𝑖,𝑡|𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝛽𝑖), 𝜆𝑖) =
exp (𝜆𝑖 ?̅?𝑖
𝑡(𝐵𝑖,𝑡))
∑ exp (𝜆𝑖 ?̅?𝑖
𝑡(𝑠))12𝑠=0
,                                                                                   (s5) 
 
where  𝜆𝑖 denotes player i’s sensitivity to the difference in payoffs between choices. When 
𝜆𝑖 → 0, this distribution will assign equal probability to all feasible choices. Whereas, when 
𝜆𝑖 → ∞, player i always chooses to report the belief that generates highest expected payoff. 
We maximize the following log-likelihood function to find estimates for the representative 
player in each treatment.50 
              
            ln𝐿(𝛽𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖) = ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑛 ( 𝑟(𝐵𝑖,𝑡|𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝛽𝑖), 𝜆𝑖))
25
𝑡=2
𝑁
𝑖=1  .                                                                (s6) 
 
Model Selection       
We estimate both the models over the data of the four treatments, and compute the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), respectively.  
 For Model 1, AIC = 2k + nln (
RSS
n
) + nln(2π) + n, 
                        BIC =  kln(n) + nln (
RSS
n
) + nln(2π) + n, 
                                                          
50 In the estimation, the computation starts from period 1. We omitted any beliefs prior to 
period 1. 
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 For Model 2, AIC = 2k − 2lnL,  
                        BIC =  kln(n) − 2lnL, 
where k is the number of parameters, n is the number of observations, RSS is the residual 
sum of squares, and lnL is the maximum of the log-likelihood function. Table s2 
summarizes these results.   
 
Table S2 Estimation results 
Model 1 
Treatment                        (10,2,2)                 (10,4,4)                  (10,6,6)                  (10,8,8) 
      𝛾𝑖                                      0.516                     0.492                        0.597                       0.567 
     Obs.                                  2160                       2232                        2304                         2232 
     RSS                                 10275.66              11730.18                  20280.44                 16524.26 
     AIC                                 9500.70                10039.63                  11551.69                 10804.45 
     BIC                                  9506.38                10045.34                  11557.43                 10810.16 
Model 2 
Treatment                        (10,2,2)                 (10,4,4)                  (10,6,6)                  (10,8,8) 
      𝛽𝑖                                     0.659                      0.613                        0.706                       0.672 
      𝜆𝑖                                     0.043                      0.043                        0.039                       0.037 
     Obs.                                  2160                       2232                         2304                        2232 
      lnL                                -5064.29                 -5470.02                  -7497.74                 -7578.21 
     AIC                                10132.58                10944.04                  14999.48                15160.42 
     BIC                                 10143.94                10955.46                  15010.96                15171.84 
 
        The results in table S2 show that both the AIC and BIC of Model 2 are close to those of 
Model 1 in the two globally stable treatments, but quite larger than those of model 1 in the 
two non-globally stable treatments. It seems that both the models have almost equal 
explanatory power in the two globally stable treatments. However, in the two non-globally 
stable treatments, the explanatory power of Model 1 is stronger than that of Model 2.  
        Overall, these results indicate that Model 1 outperforms Mode 2 in explaining the 
belief-formation process of subjects in our experiment. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Analyzing Instability in Common-Pool Resources Games 
        
 
4.1 Introduction 
A problem of common-pool resource (CPR) refers to the overexploitation to an open access 
resource, i.e. a fishing ground, which is called “the tragedy of the commons” (Harding, 
1968). Usually, to understand the appropriation dilemma in the analysis is using the Nash 
equilibrium concept in which the labor input of each appropriator is a strategy. This simple 
analysis shows that the Nash equilibrium labor inputs for production results in 
overexploitation (see, for example, Gordon (1954), Gould (1972), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), 
and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2001)). 
        However, this standard equilibrium analysis implicitly assumes that the equilibrium in 
the system is stable. Here, we say that an equilibrium of a game is stable if it is 
asymptotically stable in a dynamic version of the game. Thus, the stability of an 
equilibrium depends on the decision-making processes of players in a repeated game. In 
the theoretical analysis of Saijo and Kobayashi (2016), they focus upon the so-called best-
response dynamics, i.e., each discrete time step each player makes the best response to 
other players’ decisions in the previous time step.  This is due to recent observations by 
Healy (2006), and Healy and Mathevet (2012) who confirmed that subjects appeared to best 
respond to recent observations in five public goods mechanisms including the voluntary 
contribution mechanism. The results show that the equilibria of CPR systems tend to be 
unstable under reasonable settings. 
        Thus, the theoretical foundations of the tragedy of the commons based on static 
analysis might no longer be reliable. In fact, the theoretical analysis in Saijo and Kobayashi 
(2016) reveals that the instability is likely to bring additional inefficiency to the system, 
meaning that previous authors underestimated the level of inefficiency. This implies that 
dynamical instability is a practical problem for management of CPR and deserves detailed 
mathematical and empirical investigations.  
        With the data from the experiments by Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (hereafter, WGO) 
(1990), we focus on estimating the response functions of players.51 In the estimation, we 
consider three key aspects in players’ decision-making processes: belief formation, other-
regarding preference and decision errors.  In the modeling of belief formation, the main 
purpose is to investigate to what extent players are myopic in an experiment. In the 
modeling of other-regarding preference, we want to show how large the difference from 
the self-interested assumption in the experiments. Furthermore, the modeling of decision 
                                                          
51 We thank Professor James Walker who provided us the individual data in WGO (1990). 
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errors shows to what extent the experimental environment is different from a deterministic 
system. Overall, our purpose in this paper is to show how large the distance between the 
theoretical analysis in Saijo and Kobayashi (2016) and the experimental data of WGO (1990). 
 
4.2 Theoretical results and Implications for the observations in WGO 
(1990) 
In this section, we briefly explain the theoretical results in Saijo and Kobayashi (2016). First, 
we describe the CPR problem with a general setting. Second, we introduce the two main 
theoretical propositions of Saijo and Kobayashi (2016). Finally, we interpret the 
implications for the observations in WGO (1990). 
        Consider a local society with n (≥2) appropriators. Assume that the output 𝑦 of the 
fishing ground is a function of the total number of hours of fishing ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . That is 𝑦 =
𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), where 𝑓(. ) is an increasing, differentiable and strictly concave function. 
Therefore, the average output for each fishing hour is 𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Then, for fisher i, 
his/her expected output from his/her fishing hours 𝑥𝑖 is 𝑓(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝑥𝑖/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Furthermore, 
assume that the opportunity cost for each fishing hour is a positive constant 𝑝 and let 𝑤𝑖 
denote the endowment of fishing hours for fisher i. Then, appropriator i’s income or payoff 
is defined by 
 
 
        𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥−𝑖) = 𝑝(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖) +
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑥−𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥−𝑖),                                                             (4.1) 
                
where 𝑥−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Each appropriator faces a decision problem of how to divide her 
endowment between catching fish and personal leisure time to maximize 𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥−𝑖) subject 
to 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑖  given 𝑥−𝑖. 
        Assume that the endowment of each appropriator is large enough to ensure that all 
Nash equilibria are interior points. Suppose that the production function is concave, that is, 
f”(x) < 0. Furthermore, assume that  f(0) = 0 and  f(x) > 0 if x > 0. Suppose that appropriator i 
chooses 𝑟(𝑥−𝑖
𝑡 ) at time t + 1, where . Then, the system 
 
      𝑥𝑖
𝑡+1 = 𝑟(𝑥−𝑖
𝑡 )   (i = 1,2,...,n)                                                                                            (4.2)   
             
is locally stable at Nash equilibrium ?̂? if the linear approximation of the system (4.2) is 
stable at the Nash equilibrium ?̂?. Then we have the following proposition from Saijo and 
Kobayashi (2016) shows the necessary and sufficient condition for the local stability. 
 
Proposition 4.1. The system (4.2) is locally stable at the Nash equilibrium ?̂? if and only if  
                                   
ˆ( )1
ˆ ˆ"( )( 2) '( ) ( 1)( 4) 0.
ˆ ˆ
f x
f x n f x n n
x x
 
      
 
 
 
t  1 2, ,...
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Then, based on simple interpretations of Proposition 4.1, the following proposition from 
Saijo and Kobayashi (2016) shows the stability properties corresponding to the number of 
players.  
 
Proposition 4.2. (i) If the number of appropriators is two, then system (4.2) is locally stable 
at the Nash equilibrium.  
(ii) If the number of appropriators is at least four, then the system is locally unstable at the 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
      Therefore, according to proposition 4.2, the system of the design in WGO (1990) is 
locally unstable.The theoretical result from Saijo and Kobayashi (2016) indicates that the 
choice of players will be pulsing after several periods between 1 and 10 in the experiment 
with wi = 10 or between 0 and 25 in the experiment with wi = 25. This could be a plausible 
answer to “some unexplained pulsing behavior” in Ostrom (2006), although it is not fully 
consistent. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis indicates that the behavior pulsing that 
stems from instability tends to reduce efficiency even compared with the Nash equilibrium 
due the concavity of the payoff function.  
      Given these theoretical implications from Saijo and Kobayashi (2016), in the next 
section, I empirically estimate the response function of players with the data from WGO 
(1990) and connect the observations of pulsing behavior with the estimation results. 
Furthermore, I also provide an empirical investigation for the inefficiency stems from the 
pulsing. 
 
4.3 Reanalysis of the data from WGO (1990) 
4.3.1 The empirical model 
The model consists of three parts in the decision-making. They are the belief formation 
process, the other-regarding preference and the stochastic best response. The purpose of 
this model is to determine the distance between the myopic best response and the actual 
decision-making process of players. 
      (i). The belief formation process. Since players might take serval previous observations 
into account, in the empirical analysis of the belief formation, the key part is to determine 
the lag length of the information used by players in the experiment. Healy (2006) provides 
the experimental evidence to support a k-period average model that assume players form 
their beliefs at the current period based on the observations in previous k periods. Here, we 
slightly modify his idea of the average over the fixed k periods, but use a time-weighted 
average to model the belief formation.52 More precisely, it is, 
 
                                                          
52 The idea is borrowed from Cheung and Friedman (1997) in which they introduced a 𝛾-
weighted fictitious play model. 
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where  𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 is player i’s belief about the total choices of other players in the group at 
period t+1, 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡 is the observed total choices of other players at period t and 𝛾𝑖
𝑢 is a time-
dependent weighting factor assigned to the observation at period u. If 𝛾𝑖 = 0, the belief is 
exactly the observation at the previous period. In contrast, if 𝛾𝑖 = 1, the belief is the average 
of all previous observations.53 In this sense, the amount of 𝛾𝑖 will determine the lag length 
of the information used by player i. Therefore, this model is an analogue of the k-period 
average model. Note that, the summation starts from period 1. So, this model omitted any 
beliefs prior to period 1.  
         (ii). The other-regarding preference. To empirically capture players’ concerns about 
other group members’ payoffs, following the design of Cox et al. (2007), we simply assume 
the utility function of player i as follows: 
                                                        
         𝑢𝑖(𝑦𝑖 , ?̅?−𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖?̅?−𝑖                                                                                                   (4.4)                                                                                    
 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the material payoff of player i, ?̅?−𝑖 is the average material payoff of other group 
members and 𝛽𝑖 captures the other-regarding concerns. If 𝛽𝑖 = 0, player i is self-interested. 
If 𝛽𝑖 > 0, player i is altruistic or positive reciprocal. If 𝛽𝑖 < 0, player i is spiteful or negative 
reciprocal.  
        (iii). Stochastic best response. With the utility given by equation (4.4), we assume 
subjects make decisions with a stochastic best response dynamic (see Fudenberg and 
Levine, 1998). That is, 
  
         𝑝(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛾𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡, … , 𝑠−𝑖,1) =
exp (𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛾𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡, … , 𝑠−𝑖,1))
∑ exp (𝜆𝑖 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+1(𝑘|𝛾𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑠−𝑖,1))
𝑤𝑖
𝑘=0
,                   (4.5)    
            
where 𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 is the observed choice of player i at period t+1, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+1 is the utility of player i at 
period t+1, 𝑤𝑖 is the endowment of player i and  𝜆𝑖 > 0 is a factor that captures the decision 
errors of player i. Equation (4.5) defines the probability that player i chooses 𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 at period 
t+1 given 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡−1, … , 𝑠−𝑖,1. If 𝜆𝑖 → 0, all choices for player i have equal probability, 
                                                          
53 As Cheung and Friedman (1997) suggested, 𝛾𝑖 also might locate at outside of the range [0, 1]. 
In such cases, it is relatively counter-intuitive. 𝛾𝑖>1 indicates player i pays more attention to the 
old information than the recent information. 𝛾𝑖<0 indicates the effect from past information 
changes sign in each period.  
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which means that  player i randomly makes decisions. As i becomes large, player i 
becomes more sensitive to the difference in utility between different choices; in particular, 
when  𝜆𝑖 →∞, player i chooses the best strategies (i.e. the strategies resulting in the 
maximum utility) with probability one. We maximize the following log-likelihood function 
to find estimates for the representative player. 
 
        𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝛾𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) = ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑛 ( 𝑝(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛾𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑠−𝑖,1))
𝑇−1
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  ,                            (4.6)                    
 
4.3.2 Estimation results 
Table 4.1 summaries the estimation results. The estimation is separately conducted over 
two samples: the data from the beginning half periods and the data from the latter half 
periods. 
 
Table 4.1 Estimation results  
                                                                          Experiments  
                                               w=10                                                              w=25  
                    Periods 2-16                    Periods 16-30     Periods 2-11                    Periods 11-20 
𝛾𝑖 
 
𝛽𝑖 
 
𝜆𝑖 
 
   Obs. 
    lnL 
        0.410                                 0.653 
       (0.007)                              (0.003) 
       -1.581                                -0.491 
       (0.055)                              (0.011) 
        0.095                                 0.340 
       (0.002)                              (0.005) 
          360                                   360 
      -677.80                             -631.11 
        0.833                                 0.641 
       (0.009)                              (0.003) 
       -0.998                               -0.290 
       (0.016)                              (0.010) 
        0.045                                 0.082 
       (0.001)                              (0.001) 
         240                                    240 
      -718.50                             -681.30  
 Jackknifed standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
         Based on the meanings of parameters, it is clear that players are exactly following the 
best response dynamics when 𝛾𝑖 → 0, 𝛽𝑖 → 0, and 𝜆𝑖 →∞. Now, let us interpret the 
estimation results. Basically, we think the model captures the decision-making process 
quite well. First, in both the experiments, 𝜆𝑖 becomes larger with period progress, which 
indicates the decision errors become fewer (𝜒2(1) = 24.98 for the experiment with w=10, and 
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𝜒2(1) = 9.52 for the experiment with w=25 by the likelihood ratio tests). We also notice that 
it is larger in the experiment with w=10 than in the experiment with w=25. This result is 
intuitive, since the number of possible choices are much fewer in the experiment with w=10 
than that in the experiment with w=25. 
       Second, we turn to see the estimates of 𝛽𝑖. All estimates are negative. This result is 
intuitive, since the environment of common pool resource (CPR) is competitive. An 
interesting finding is that, in both the experiments, the estimates of 𝛽𝑖 become closer to zero 
when periods progress (𝜒2(1) = 13.14 for the experiment with w=10, and 𝜒2(1) = 8.44 for the 
experiment with w=25 by the likelihood ratio tests). It indicates that, players are feeling 
worse when other group members increase their working hours in the beginning half of the 
experiment than they do when it happens in the latter half of the experiment. This result 
implicates that, subjects become more self-interested with repeated trials in both the 
experiments. 
       Final, the interpretation for estimates of 𝛾𝑖 is not very obvious. It seems players 
becomes more myopic in the latter half of the experiment with w=25 than in the beginning 
half. However, it appears that the opposite is the case, i.e. players are more myopic in the 
beginning than in the latter half in the experiment with w=10. 
 
Result 4.1: The estimation results support that, decision errors become fewer and players 
become more self-interested over time. Therefore, subjects become closer to making best 
response to previous observations (not only the last observation) with repeated trials in 
both the experiments.   
 
4.4 Connection between estimation results and pulsing behavior 
Our estimation results suggest that players’ decisions become closer to the best responses 
to previous observations with periods. Therefore, given our theoretical results that best 
response dynamics will induce some pulsing behavior, we can make a hypothesis. 
   
Hypothesis 4.1: The group sum will be pulsing more in the latter half of the experiment 
than it does in the beginning half of the experiment. 
 
       To test this hypothesis, we computed the sample autocorrelation for the group sum in 
each group.54 Table 4.2 summarizes the results. 
                                                          
54 The sample autocorrelation is also used in Rassenti et al. (2000) as a measure of the pulsing 
behavior. The sample autocorrelation of individual choices is also a way to check the pulsing 
behavior. However, if players within the same group are not increasing and reducing their 
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Table 4.2 The sample autocorrelations 
                                                                                Experiments                   
                                                   w=10                                                           w=25     
     Group           Periods 2-16             Periods 16-30            Periods 2-11         Periods 11-20 
         1 
         2 
         3 
         -0.133                        -0.137 
         -0.005                        -0.344  
          0.086                        -0.279 
       -0.131                    -0.366                     
        0.025                    -0.210 
        0.140                    -0.221 
  
      These results support our hypothesis quite well. All groups generate a negative sample 
autocorrelation in the latter half of the experiment, which indicates pulsing. However, 3 out 
of 6 groups have a positive sample autocorrelation in the beginning half of the experiment.  
 
Result 4.2: The sample autocorrelations of all groups in the latter half of the experiment are 
negative and less than those in the beginning half of the experiment.  
 
Now, let us consider whether pulsing caused inefficiency in the experiments. As Table 5.2 
(page 117) and Figure 5.4 (page 119) in OGW (1994) show, the low efficiency in the 
experiment with w=25 mainly stems from the beginning half of the experiment. However, 
we should not use the data from the beginning half of the experiments because players’ 
behaviors are in a transient phase. I therefore use the data from the latter half of the 
experiments. Table 4.3 shows some statistics to test the hypothesis that pulsing caused 
inefficiency. 
 
Table 4.3 Statistics  
                                                                                                   Experiments                                 
                                                                      w=10, Periods 16-30          w=25,Periods 11-20  
Centile (25%) 
Centile (75%) 
Interquartile range 
62 
68 
6 
60 
71 
11 
                                                                                                                                                                          
working hours simultaneously, the pulsing might not be related to our theoretical analysis. In 
this sense, I only check the sample autocorrelation for the group sum.   
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Average payoff (standard deviation) 
Predicted payoff, Nash 
T-statistic* 
63.81 (8.16) 
66 
-2.12 
133.56 (22.87) 
141 
-3.59 
*We first compute the average across periods for each individual, and then conduct the t-test 
over the sample of those averages. 
 
       We use the interquartile range to measure the amplitude of the pulsing in the group 
sum. It shows the amplitude of the pulsing is larger in the experiment with w=25 than in 
the experiment with w=10. Second, we report the statistics of individual payoffs and 
compare them with the Nash prediction. The t-tests reject the null hypothesis that the 
average payoff equals the predicted payoff of the Nash equilibrium for both the 
experiments at 5% level. This result supports our theoretical analysis that the pulsing 
around the Nash equilibrium will results in a lower payoff. Furthermore, we also 
compared the efficiency between the two experiments to see whether the larger pulsing 
amplitude will induce a lower efficiency.55 The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the 
efficiency in the experiment with w=10 is significantly higher than in the experiment with 
w=25 (p-value = 0.0259).56 Given these findings, we suggest that WGO’s (1990) result is 
consistent with the theory of Saijo and Kobayashi (2016) regarding the efficiency.       
       
4.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted some statistical analyses to test the hypothesis that the pulsing 
behavior in labor inputs observed in WGO’s (1990) experiment is due to myopic best-
response behavior. The result shows that individuals were resorting to fairly myopic and 
rather deterministic decision rules. The analyses also revealed that the labor inputs are 
indeed pulsing (negative autocorrelation was found between labor inputs in succeeding 
periods) rather than in an equilibrium in the latter half of the experiments. Furthermore, 
our statistical analyses support the hypothesis that the difference in efficiency between the 
two experiments by WGO (1990), which are different in initial endowment, is partially due 
to pulsing. Given these empirical facts, the empirical result provides a support for the 
theoretical analysis in Saijo and Kobayashi (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 We use the same index of the efficiency as used in WGO (1990).  
56 Similar to the t-test, we also compute the average across periods for each individual to 
eliminate the time series autocorrelation, and then conduct the Wilcoxon rank-sum test over the 
sample of those averages. 
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Chapter 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the three theoretical arguments of instability in social 
dilemma games. They are, the instability in the VCM with homogeneous design, the global 
and non-global stability in the VCM with heterogeneous design, and the instability in the 
CPR game. With the empirical method of experimental economics, the experimental results 
reflect some distance to the theoretical predictions. 
       In the first study, the group total contributions are not pulsing as much as the 
theoretical prediction. However, the experimental results show an increasing dispersion 
among individual contributions. The main source of this observation might be due to the 
presence of conditional cooperators. However, without a precise theoretical background 
for the interaction among players with several different other-regarding preferences in an 
unstable VCM environment, this conjecture is hard to be tested. But, on the theoretical 
basis, our observation regarding the increasing dispersion still indicates that the 
experimental system is not asymptotical stable. In other words, we are missing the 
theoretical connection between this observation and the theoretical results of instability. 
This remains as an open question in our study. 
      In the second study, the experimental results basically rejected the non-global stable 
argument from the theory in the environment with the particular experimental design. The 
main reason is that human subjects changed their strategical thinking in the belief 
formation process and the responding process in the non-globally stable treatments. This 
adaptive change makes the experimental system more stable than the theoretical prediction. 
As we pointed out in the conclusion of chapter 3, since our experiments chose the simplest 
design, whether this adaptive change can keep the stability for the system still remains 
unknown in the experimental design with more than three players in the group. 
      In the third study, the analysis of the experimental data from WGO (1990) supports that 
subjects become closer to making best response to previous observations. Therefore, the 
argument of instability can at least partially explain the pulsing behavior in the group sum. 
Furthermore, we clearly show that the pulsing behavior induces additional inefficiency in 
the CPR. 
      Overall, via the experimental studies, we find some consistent results corresponding to 
the theoretical predictions. More importantly, the inconsistent results reflect some flaws in 
the theoretical assumptions. First, these observations point the way for the refinement of 
assumptions in the next step. Especially, it is necessary to build up a theory regarding the 
interaction of several different social oriented players in a nonlinear VCM environment. 
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Second, the experimental evidence show that some theoretical predictions, i.e. unequal 
payoff distributions among players and inefficiency from the pulsing, point out new 
problems in social dilemma games, which stem from the instability. These new findings 
deserve more theoretical and empirical investigations in the future. Third, generally 
speaking, the uncertainty to decision-makers is greater in an unstable game environment 
than in a stable game environment. Our finding indicates that human subjects are willing 
to take more cognitive costs in an unstable game environment. This interesting finding in 
the second study sheds some new lights in the field of cognition and decision in 
uncertainty environment. 
      Finally, based on the insight of instability, these studies firstly reveal some more 
profound understanding regarding the social dilemma games than previous studies. 
However, they also show that the related works are still at the initial stage.   
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